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TRUST AND CONTROL: THE VALUE
EFFECT OF VENTURE CAPITAL TERM
SHEET PROVISIONS AS RISK
ALLOCATION TOOLS
Jason M. Gordon and David Orozco*
ABSTRACT
The parties to a venture funding agreement are in a state of coopetition.
The parties account for perceived risk in the entrepreneur-investor relation-
ship through varying levels of control demanded from and trust afforded to
the other party.  The level of risk perceived by each party may differ along
individual aspects of the prospective equity deal.  The provisions of the
term sheet delineate the subjective risk perceptions of each party to the
transaction by allocating control or trusting a party with decision-making
rights.  When negotiating term sheet provisions, a party should seek to un-
derstand and recognize the risk perceived by the other party and attempt to
afford the level of control or trust necessary to achieve a relational agree-
ment that provides the greatest value for the parties collectively.  An opti-
mal allocation of control and trust adequately captures the perceived risk
of each party, promotes cooperation between the parties, and ultimately
facilitates the performance of the business venture.  Understanding the sub-
jective risk perceptions of each party to the investment transaction will fa-
cilitate the objective of negotiating a term sheet that maximizes the value
created for all parties.
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INTRODUCTION
In the venture capital community, it is a well-known yet under-re-
ported fact that the relationships between investors and entrepreneurs
often turn sour and may even lead to litigation.  At the heart of this ten-
sion are conflicting interests between investors and entrepreneurs that lie
in conflicting risk perceptions, access to information, and the desire to
control the venture to minimize any negative fallout arising from this deli-
cate business relationship.
Take the case of San Francisco-based Rapt, Inc.  Several of Rapt’s co-
founders threated to leave the company after a falling out with the com-
pany’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO).1  The company’s venture capital
investors took negatively to this decision and exercised their right to dilute
the departing founders’ common stock through a subsequent round of eq-
uity financing.2  After the investors diluted the stock, the departing co-
founders commenced litigation against the venture capitalists.3
Start-up ventures such as Rapt often depend heavily upon outside capi-
tal during the growth stages of their business lifecycle.4  The sale of equity,
which is a primary source of business capital for rapidly growing busi-
1. Will Accel and Levensohn Get Rapt?, THOMPSON FINANCIAL PRIVATE EQUITY




4. See Albert V. Bruno & T. Tyebjee, The Entrepreneur’s Search for Capital, 1 J. BUS.
VENTURING 61, 61–74 (1986).
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nesses, entails inherent risks for both the investor and the entrepreneur.5
Risk is defined in this context as the likelihood that the start-up’s business
activity will lead to undesirable results for either the venture capital inves-
tor or the entrepreneur.6  Each party will, therefore, seek to allocate risk
to protect against her own interest.7  Within an equity funding transaction,
the parties negotiate the allocation of risk through the use of a term sheet,
a non-binding document containing the most important and agreed upon
equity financing terms.8
This Article will examine the use of term sheets to allocate specific
elements of each party’s perceived risk.  The allocation of risk is character-
ized by the amount of control attributed to each party contrasted with the
level of trust between the parties.9  In an ideal relationship with complete
trust and information, the parties would agree on minimal control provi-
sions.  However, given that information asymmetries exist and the parties
to a venture capital investment often do not know each other and there-
fore lack a basis for trust, the control terms negotiated in a term sheet
serve as important risk mitigation tools for each party in a scenario best
characterized as coopetition.  Coopetition refers to a scenario in which
parties both compete for resources and cooperate to achieve strategic
long-term goals.10
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I reviews the need for equity
funding in start-up ventures and the competing interests or expectations
between the investor and the entrepreneur.  Part II explores the inherent
risk associated with start-up ventures; the perception of risk and its effect
on decision making; and the role of cooperation, trust, and control provi-
sions in the allocation of risk.  Part III addresses the risk allocation be-
tween investor and entrepreneur by focusing on business valuation, timing
of funding, and the individual risk allocation components of the term
sheet.  A central claim of this Article is that the level of trust between the
parties impacts the risk perceived by each party.  Levels of risk and trust
motivate the varying levels of control allocated to each party through a
venture capital term sheet.  The desire for control is an important aspect
to understand because it affects the level of cooperation between the par-
5. Raphael Amit et al., Entrepreneurial Ability, Venture Investments, and Risk Shar-
ing, 36 MGMT. SCI. 1233, 1233 (1990).
6. Terje Aven & Ortwin Renn, On Risk Defined as an Event Where the Outcome is
Uncertain, 12 J. RISK RES. 1, 1–11 (2009).
7. See Thomas Hellmann, The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Con-
tracts, 29 RAND J. ECONOMICS 57, 57–76 (1998).
8. Dirk De Clercq et al., An Entrepreneur’s Guide to the Venture Capital Galaxy,
ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., Aug. 2006, at 90, 99–100.
9. See Tushar Kanti Das & Bing-Sheng Teng, Trust, Control, and Risk in Strategic
Alliances: An Integrated Framework, 22 ORGANIZATION STUD. 251, 251–85 (2001).
10. See Xueming Luo et al., Cross-Functional “Coopetition”: The Simultaneous Role of
Cooperation and Competition Within Firms, 70 J. MARKETING 67, 68 (2006) (discussing how
coopetition occurs whenever there is a mixture of competitive and cooperative behaviors,
which may include such diverse business settings as departments, business units, or firms).
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ties.  Part IV addresses the value effect of the allocation of control provi-
sions to facilitate a relational contract and discusses the implications for
further research in the area of risk perception in the effective allocation of
control in the entrepreneur-investor relationship.  Part V concludes by as-
serting that the cooperation between stakeholders facilitated by awareness
in the negotiation of control provisions leads to improved organizational
performance of the start-up venture.
I. THE ROLE OF EQUITY INVESTMENT IN START-UP VENTURES
Equity funding is a critical component in the development of en-
trepreneurial ventures.11  This type of funding may be the best or only
available option for many start-up ventures.  Part I explores the role of
venture capital in the start-up venture, providing an overview of the equity
funding process and outlining each party’s objectives.
A. Start-up Ventures and Their Need for Capital
Entrepreneurship is commonly understood as the founding or running
of a business.  A more precise definition of entrepreneurship focuses on
the planning and assembling of resources necessary to bring about a ven-
ture.12  Pursuant to this definition, entrepreneurs assemble resources
around a venture concept to create a business that produces the type and
amount of desired value.13  The resources necessary to bring about the
business consist of human and physical capital.  Human capital comprises
the entrepreneur’s skill, intellect, and relationship capital.  Physical capi-
tal, often associated with investors, comprises the assets or funds necessary
to assemble and employ any required assets in addition to what the entre-
preneurs may contribute.14
The amount of physical capital required by a growth-oriented start-up
venture is often large and beyond the financial means of the entrepre-
neurs.  Entrepreneurs often need to employ alternative funding strategies
to acquire this necessary capital, which include personal or business debt
arrangements and the sale of ownership or equity interest in the prospec-
tive business venture.15  The funding strategy employed by an entrepre-
neur is limited by the financing options available; however, it also depends
11. Harry J. Sapienza & Jeffry A. Timmons, The Role of Venture Capitalists in New
Ventures: What Determines their Importance? ACAD. MGMT. PROC., Aug. 1989, at 74.
12. See generally Sharon A. Alvarez & Lowell W. Busenitz, The Entrepreneurship of
Resource-based Theory, 27 J. MANAGEMENT 755, 755–75 (2001).
13. See David B. Audretsch & Max Keilbach, Does Entrepreneurship Capital Matter?,
28 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 419, 419–429 (2004); Per Davidsson, & Benson
Honig, The Role of Social and Human Capital Among Nascent Entrepreneurs, 18 J. BUS.
VENTURING 301, 301–31 (2003).
14. Audretsch & Keilbach, supra note 13, at 419.
15. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance:
The Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle, 22 J. BANKING
& FIN. 613, 618–21 (1998).
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upon her intent, objectives, or aspirations (collectively, referred to in this
Article as objectives) for the business.16  This Article focuses on the deci-
sion to seek venture capital from third-party equity investors—referred to
generally as a private placement of equity.
Equity investment by venture capital investors is a primary source of
funds needed to scale a venture’s product or services.17  It provides the
physical capital necessary to commence and grow operations.18  For pur-
poses of this Article, we define equity investment as early stage growth
funds provided by venture capital firms.  This definition includes invest-
ments that exceed amounts typically offered by individual angel inves-
tors19 and are less than those offered by large private equity firms.20
Aside from the financial necessities of the firm, a private placement of
equity may offer secondary benefits for the business venture.21  For exam-
ple, equity investors may offer human capital in the form of advice to the
entrepreneur, an infrastructure of resource providers (such as accounting,
law, and public relations) to the business,22 and an augmented reputation
of the venture within the market.23  These and numerous other benefits
16. The capital structure of the firm varies with the characteristics of the firm. Id. at
660. The objectives for growth and the stage of business development therefore affect the
funding structure employed by the entrepreneur.
17. See Antonio Davila et al., Venture Capital Financing and the Growth of Startup
Firms, 18 J. BUS. VENTURING 689, 689–708 (2003).
18. Berger & Udell, supra note 15, at 622. Within the business plan, capital is typically
broken into start-up and working capital. Working capital generally accounts for the funds
necessary to grow the venture in accordance with the financial projections.
19. See Andrew Burke et al., What Determines the Level of Informal Venture Finance
Investment? Market Clearing Forces and Gender Effects, 42 SMALL BUS. ECON. 467, 473–74
(2014) (summarizing descriptive statistics taken from surveys of early-stage investments).
20. See M. Sinan Goktan & Erdem Ucar, Public vs. Private: Characteristics of the
Companies Backed by Listed Private Equity, 12(5) J. ACCT. & FIN., Dec. 2012, at 11–25.
21. Charles J. Cuny & Eli Talmor, The Staging of Venture Capital Financing: Mile-
stone vs. Rounds 2 (Apr. 2005) (EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings Paper), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=487414 (citing William A. Sahlman, The Struc-
ture and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473 (1990); Josh
Lerner, Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms, 50 J. FIN. 301 (1995) (regard-
ing “the dual role of venture capitalists and their involvement in monitoring and govern-
ance”)); see also Thomas Hellmann & Manju Puri, The Interaction Between Product Market
and Financing Strategy: The Role of Venture Capital, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 959, 959–84 (2000);
Thomas Hellmann & Manju Puri, Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-up
Firms: Empirical Evidence, 57 J. FINANCE 169, 169–97 (2002) (providing empirical evidence
of the economic value of in-kind services provided to the business venture by investors).
22. Davila et al., supra note 17, at 691–93 (“[Venture capitalists] also bring a network
of contacts with experienced infrastructure providers (such accounting firms, law firms, and
public relations firms) and potential professional managers.”).
23. See id. (suggesting that associating with a venture capitalist investor yields an ad-
vantage in attracting high quality employees, gaining new customers, and negotiating alli-
ances and joint ventures with key players).
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provided by venture capitalists drive growth, a primary objective of start-
up ventures.24
B. Overview of the Equity Investment Transactional Process
The venture capital funding transaction generally adheres to a common
model.  First, the potential investor reviews the entrepreneur’s business
plan and conducts an informational interview with the entrepreneur.
Next, the potential investor and the entrepreneur engage in preliminary
negotiations regarding the potential purchase of business equity.  The par-
ties then create a finalized term sheet that outlines the major provisions of
the proposed equity deal, and the equity investors conducts due diligence
for a specified period.  Following due diligence, the parties negotiate the
purchase agreement and collateral documents, complete necessary regula-
tory filings, and, finally, consummate the exchange of equity for capital.25
Any of these steps may be absent or vary considerably depending on the
individual funding deal, but these steps provide a baseline for understand-
ing the major steps in the equity investment transaction process.
The term sheet negotiation phase of the transaction is a pivotal point in
which individual cognition affects the immediate relationship between the
parties and the long-term characteristics of the start-up venture.  Term
sheet negotiations begin once the investor and entrepreneur are serious
about consummating an equity investment deal.26  At this point during the
negotiation process, the entrepreneur and investor discuss the major issues
affecting the transaction.27  Both parties want to be certain that there is a
meeting of the minds before committing further resources, entering a le-
gally binding relationship, and undertaking further due diligence.28  The
results of the negotiation phase are reduced to a number of general provi-
sions within the term sheet.  While the term sheet is generally not binding,
these terms provide the foundation for the agreement.29  Once these terms
are decided, they are rarely changed at a later stage of the transaction.
24. See id. (suggesting that equity financing drives the growth of start-up ventures).
25. See De Clercq et al., supra note 8, at 98–100.
26. Id. at 99 (“Thus, terms that are deal breakers are identified and negotiated before
either side gets too far into the process. The result of this negotiation is a written document,
commonly referred to as the ‘term sheet.’”).
27. Id. at 99–100 (“[The term sheet] summarizes the major terms of the potential [ven-
ture capitalist] investment. If the outcome of the due diligence process is favorable, then the
venture capitalist will make an investment subject to the terms outlined in the term sheet.
The actual closing of the investment transaction requires a plethora of detailed legal docu-
ments that are negotiated in detail at the end of the selection process.”).
28. Id. at 99 (“Since the evaluation process is time-consuming for both parties, it is
common to negotiate the major terms of the deal before the [venture capitalist] starts exten-
sive due diligence.”).
29. Id. at 100 (“While the term sheet is not binding on any party, it is unusual for ‘deal
breakers’ to arise when the final legal documents are drafted.”).
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Each party then depends upon counsel in drafting, negotiating, and finaliz-
ing these and other ancillary terms of the agreement.30
C. The Entrepreneur’s and Investor’s Objectives
A unique tension exists in the entrepreneur and venture capitalist rela-
tionship that can be attributed in part to the parties’ conflicting goals.  This
Section examines the common and at times conflicting objectives between
these two parties.
1. The Entrepreneur’s Objectives
In a start-up venture, the entrepreneur seeks to assemble the resources
necessary to grow the venture as quickly as possible without regard to
immediate profitability.31  She does not depend upon the venture to pro-
vide for or fund the entrepreneur’s lifestyle; rather, she will generally take
a meager or no salary in the early stages of the business venture.32  Most,
if not all, of the business earnings are reinvested in the business to increase
the speed of business growth.33  Rather than look to the earnings of the
business to provide for her living expenses, the entrepreneur hopes to ex-
tract value from the business at some future exit event, such as a sale of
the business.34  The concept behind this type of venture is that the most
efficient use of any funds generated by the business is growing and creat-
ing additional value within the business.35
The earnings generated by the business activity, however, are rarely
sufficient to provide the funds necessary to achieve the potential business
growth.36  The start-up entrepreneur, absent other means of access to
funding, must seek outside sources of capital to fund the business activity’s
growth.  The business’ growth projections, which may include the
scalability of the business’ product or service, are a primary concern of
equity investors, who seek investments with high growth potential.37
30. Id. (“Because many of the term sheet issues have been difficult and emotional,
often the details of closing are handled by the parties’ lawyers with little direct involvement
from either entrepreneur or [venture capitalist].”).
31. See Martin Przysuski et al., What Operating Losses Tell Us, 5 CORP. BUS. TAX’N
MONTHLY 1, 2–3 (2003) (explaining “startup losses” as necessary at certain stages of the
business venture).
32. Robert D. Hall & Susan E. Woodward, The Burden of the Nondiversifiable Risk of
Entrepreneurship, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1163, 1163–64 (2010), available at http://web.stanford.
edu/~rehall/Hall-Woodward%20on%20entrepreneurship.pdf.
33. See Seppo Leminen & Mika Westerlund, Categorizing the Growth Strategies of
Small Firms, TECH. INNOVATION MGMT. REV., May 2012, at 5, available at http://timreview.
ca/sites/default/files/article_PDF/LeminenWesterlund_TIMReview_May2012_0.pdf (linking
growth strategies with use of capital inside the firm).
34. See Hall & Woodward, supra note 32, at 1163–64.
35. Id.
36. See Seppo Leminen & Mika Westerlund supra note 33, at 8.
37. John Hall & Charles W. Hofer, Venture Capitalists’ Decision Criteria in New Ven-
ture Evaluation, 8 J. BUS. VENTURING 25, 25–42 (1993).
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These projections, therefore, affect the type and amount of resources
available to the entrepreneur to fund the business venture.
An important objective of most entrepreneurs is to retain as much con-
trol and ownership as possible throughout the life of the enterprise.  The
tension between an investor and entrepreneur about eventual control of
the enterprise is plays a central role in the investment negotiations.  Ac-
cording to one study, fewer than 25% of founders led the initial public
offering of the business they started.38  According to that same study, four
out of every five founders are forced to step down as CEOs by equity
investors and majority shareholders.39  The decision or order to step aside
from the top leadership position of a venture they initiated, which may
have started out more as a labor of love, is a difficult and emotional event
that founders seek to avoid.  Sometimes, the founder may lack objectivity
or a profit-seeking objective in their desire to retain control and leader-
ship.  According to research, entrepreneurs are typically convinced that
they are the only ones who can lead their start-ups to success and they are
typically overconfident about their prospects for success.40  Both of these
often inaccurate perceptions will lead a founder to seek as much control of
the enterprise as possible, which may work to the detriment of investors.
2. The Investor’s Objectives
In exchange for an ownership interest in the business, equity investors
provide the funds necessary to grow the business venture.41  As profes-
sional equity investors, venture capitalists typically organize as a partner-
ship and obtain investment funds from limited partner investors.42  The
limited partnership is commonly referred to as the venture capital fund.43
The venture capitalist, as general partner, manages and invests the funds
in start-up ventures with the purpose of achieving a specific or target re-
turn on their investment.44  The venture capital firm generally seeks a re-
turn on its individual investments within three to seven years from the
time of investment.45  This investment horizon is important because the
capital in the fund, which consists of invested capital and any accrued re-
38. Noam Wasserman, The Founder’s Dilemma, HARVARD BUS. REV., Feb. 2008, at
102, available at http://hbr.org/2008/02/the-founders-dilemma/ar/1.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Michael Gorman & William A. Sahlman, What do Venture Capitalists Do?, 4 J.
BUS. VENTURING 231, 231–48 (1989).
42. William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organiza-
tions, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 473 (1990)
43. Id.
44. See generally Sophie Manigart et al., Determinants of Required Return in Venture
Capital Investments: A Five-Country Study, 17 J. BUS. VENTURING 291 (2002).
45. Id. at 300.
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turns, is due to be returned to the limited partner investors within a speci-
fied period.46
The equity investor reviews business plans, searching for businesses
that require growth funds and have the capacity to achieve a level of
growth capable of producing a significant return on investment.47  This
means that the business must show potential to produce significant reve-
nues and achieve a high valuation at an anticipated future exit event.48
Inherent in any start-up venture is some degree of risk.  As previously
stated, risk is generally understood as the likelihood that the business ac-
tivity will lead to undesirable results for either the investor or entrepre-
neur.49  When deciding whether to invest in the venture, the investor will
balance the required return on funds invested with the level of risk inher-
ent in the investment.50  This risk for the investor is based on the
probability that the venture will provide the desired level of return within
the stated investment period.51  While the amount of risk involved in in-
vesting in a venture is necessarily a subjective determination, investors
commonly use certain general factors to assess the level of risk.  These
factors include the stage of business growth, the experience or credentials
of the founders, the current assets of the business, the business’ apparent
competitive advantage (such as having secure intellectual property), the
intended use of funds, current business revenue, and existing service con-
tracts.52  Each factor either augments or diminishes the investor’s confi-
dence that the business will create the type and amount of value desired.
Another important objective for the equity investor is to maximize the
potential for start-up success through effective corporate governance.  As
previously mentioned, most founders are removed from the CEO leader-
46. D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315,
345 (2005) [hereinafter Smith, Exit Structure] (internal citation omitted) (“Exit is not merely
optional for venture capitalists. Most venture capital funds have a fixed life, usually ten years
with an option to extend for a period up to three years. Any venture capitalist who desires to
remain in business, therefore, must successfully raise funds, invest them in portfolio compa-
nies, then exit the companies and return the proceeds to the fund investors, who in turn are
expected to reinvest in a new fund formed by the same venture capitalist (assuming that the
previous investment was successful.”); see also Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, An Analysis of
Compensation in the U.S. Venture Capital Partnership, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 19 (1999) (stating
that “almost all venture and buyout funds are designed to be “self-liquidating,” that is, to
dissolve after ten or twelve years[ ]”).
47. See David Kirsch, Brent Goldfarb, & Azi Gera, Form or Substance: The Role of
Business Plans in Venture Capital Decision Making, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 487 (2009) (dis-
cussing [venture capitalist] funding decisions).
48. See id.
49. See Aven & Renn, supra note 6.
50. Hall & Hofer, Venture Capitalists’ Decision, supra note 37, at 38.
51. John G. Cochrane, The Risk and Return of Venture Capital, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 28
(2005).
52. See, e.g., John C. Ruhnka & John E. Young, Some Hypotheses About Risk in Ven-
ture Capital Investing, 6 J. BUS. VENTURING 115 (1991) (describing a number of factors ven-
ture capital funds may consider when evaluating the risk of a possible investment).
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ship position within a matter of a few years following a venture capitalist
equity investment.  This occurs because the equity investors typically gain
majority ownership and control of the start-up in exchange for their equity
investment.  As a start-up matures and grows, its need for an experienced
business leader increases and the role of the board at that point is to re-
place the founder with a CEO with a broader managerial and leadership
skill set.
II. RISK: PERCEPTION, DECISION MAKING, AND CONTROL
A. Risk and Uncertainty in Entrepreneurial Ventures
Undertaking or investing in entrepreneurial ventures is statistically
risky—approximately 50% of U.S.-based new ventures fail within 5 years
and 75% of businesses fail within 20 years.53  The success or failure rate
for new ventures, however, is only one aspect of risk.  A broader view of
risk focuses on uncertainty or the possibility of occurrences that can
thwart the intent of the parties involved in the entrepreneurial venture.54
For example, an investor’s view of venture risk might include the possibil-
ity that the business will fail to reach its growth goals and yield a subpar
return.  The entrepreneur’s view of risk may include a loss of control or a
deviation from the start-up’s mission or ethos.  These examples serve only
to demonstrate the various and unique types of risk that exist beyond the
broad categorization of success or failure.  This is important for under-
standing the tension in the entrepreneur-investor relationship because the
level of risk perceived by a party to an equity transaction may depend on
the type of risk perceived.
While entrepreneur and investor may perceive different types of risk,
all risk is based on uncertainty.55  Uncertainty regarding any aspect of the
business or the market itself represents a unique form of risk to the indi-
viduals involved in the business.56  Market-demand uncertainty, for exam-
ple, exists when an investor and entrepreneur have different levels of
certainty regarding the ability of the business to achieve its goals based on
the manner in which the market receives the business.57  Ability uncer-
tainty, on the other hand, consists of each party’s level of certainty about
53. Business Employment Dynamics, Entrepreneurship and the U.S. Economy, U.S.
BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/bdm/entrepreneurship/entrepreneurship.htm (last
visited July 13, 2015).
54. Brian Wu & Anne Marie Knott, Entrepreneurial Risk and Market Entry, 52 MGMT.
SCI. 1315, 1315 (2006) (“We believe that the disparity between intuition and theory versus the
stylized facts lies in the dimensionality of uncertainty.”).
55. Id. (“In particular, we propose that there are two distinct sources of uncertainty in
entrepreneurial ventures: (1) uncertainty regarding market demand, and (2) uncertainty re-
garding one’s own entrepreneurial ability.”).
56. See Aven and Renn, supra note 6, at 6–9.
57. See Wu & Knott, supra note 54, at 1316–17.
Spring 2015] Perception, Trust and Control 205
the ability of the entrepreneur to lead the business.58  These types of un-
certainty, along with many other forms of identifiable risk, affect the par-
ties’ perception of venture risk and the total risk attributable to the
venture.59
The level of risk that an individual associates with an activity is deter-
mined by how that individual perceives or cognitively processes the situa-
tion.60  While risk involves the probability of a particular outcome, risk
propensity regards an individual’s propensity to act pursuant to that risk.61
In other words, an individual will act according to the amount of perceived
risk that she is willing to accept62 and her actions or intended actions may
vary depending upon how she perceives a given situation.  Therefore, in an
equity funding transaction, the entrepreneur and investor will consum-
mate a funding deal if the perceived characteristics of the deal are consis-
tent with their respective risk propensities.  Unknowingly, the terms used
to allocate risk in the venture, as expressed in the term sheet, may have a
detrimental effect on the level of cooperation between the parties.
B. Trust, Control and Cooperation
According to social capital literature, trust is the subjective belief
about the likelihood that a potential trading partner will act honestly or as
expected.63  A personalized level of trust is dependent upon the evolving
58. Gavin Cassar, Industry and Startup Experience on Entrepreneur Forecast Perform-
ance in New Firms, 29 J. BUS. VENTURING 137–51 (2014) (examining the benefit of industry
experience on entrepreneurial forecast performance).
59. Wu & Knott, supra note 54, at 1315, (“We further propose that entrepreneurs dis-
play risk aversion with respect to demand uncertainty but exhibit overconfidence or ‘appar-
ent risk seeking’ with respect to ability uncertainty. Accordingly, while entrepreneurs are risk
averse in the classic sense of preferring a certain payment to an uncertain payment with
equivalent expected value, their overconfidence predisposes them to bear economic risk
under a given set of circumstances.”).
60. Saulo D. Barbosa et al., The Role of Cognitive Style and Risk Preference on En-
trepreneurial Self-efficacy and Entrepreneurial Intentions, 13 J. LEADERSHIP & ORGANIZA-
TIONAL STUD., May 2007, at 90 (citing Kenneth R. MacCrimmon & Donald A. Wehrung, A
Portfolio of Risk Measures, 19 THEORY & DECISION 1, 1–29 (1985) (stating that cognition is
the reason why situations look more or less risky); see also R. M. HOGARTH, JUDGMENT AND
CHOICE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION 13 (Wiley 2d ed., 1987) (“[F]rom a logical view-
point, it is absurd to make a statement of the kind that one situation or venture is more
uncertain than another; it is simply you who are more uncertain about one of the
situations.”).
61. See Sim B. Sitkin & Amy L. Pablo, Reconceptualizing the Determinants of Risk
Behavior, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 9, 18–19 (1992) (defining risk propensity as a general ten-
dency or desire to either pursue or avoid risk); see also Barbosa et al., supra note 60, at 90
(citing MacCrimmon & Wehrung, supra note 60, at 1 (“Risk-taking has two components: the
riskiness of situations and the willingness of people to take risks.”)).
62. Barbosa et al., supra note 60, at 90 (“[R]isk preferences are by definition ‘the will-
ingness of people to take risks.’”).
63. Laura Bottazzi et al., The Importance of Trust for Investment: Evidence from Ven-
ture Capital 1, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16923, 2011).
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relationship between two specific parties.64  When a relational contract is
maintained, personalized trust is present, as is the mutual trust that indi-
viduals develop through repeated experience and interactions.65  The
hallmarks of a relational contract include longer duration and greater per-
sonal interaction and cooperation between the contracting parties.66  Dis-
crete contractual transactions differ from relational contracts in some
fundamental characteristics, including commencement, duration, termina-
tion, measurement and specificity, planning, sharing vs. dividing benefits
and burdens, interdependence, future cooperation, solidarity, personal re-
lations among participants, and power.67  Venture capital term sheet pro-
visions provide a good setting in which to measure the extent of relational
contract because term sheet provisions often relate to the above men-
tioned characteristics and can vary in terms of their degree of contractual
formality, control, and specificity.
The venture capital investment process provides an interesting setting
to examine trust, the contracting process, and relational contracting.  A
venture capitalist and an entrepreneur typically do not know one another
before contracting.68  Yet, after they enter into a contract, venture capital-
ist and entrepreneur work closely together and have an opportunity to
build trust over the course of their relationship.69  Both parties are clearly
incentivized to build trust and a relational contract.  For example, the en-
trepreneur is interested in developing trust to avoid being diluted or shut
out from the venture in a manner that is perceived as detrimental.  An
early investor participating in a Series A round of financing is incentivized
to a greater extent to develop trust with an entrepreneur than investors
that join during subsequent rounds of financing, such as investors in Series
B, C, and D rounds of financing.  For several reasons, the earliest round
investor is incentivized to establish trust with the entrepreneur and build a
relational contract as early as possible.  First, the investor stands to benefit
from subsequent rounds of financing if she develops trust and cooperation
with the entrepreneur and, accordingly, prices that level of trust and coop-
eration into the original share valuations.  Further, these early round in-
64. Id. (contrasting personalized trust with generalized levels of trust, e.g. the trust
that is necessary to invest in anonymous markets as a whole, such as stock markets); see
Paola Sapienza, Trust and Financial Markets, in THE FIRST CREDIT MARKET TURMOIL OF
THE 21ST CENTURY 29, 33 (Douglas D. Evanoff, Philipp Hartmann & George G. Kaufman
eds., 2009).
65. See Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and
Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912, 916
(1994).
66. See IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS,
12–13 (2d ed. 1978); Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its
Shortfalls and the Need for a “Rich Classificatory Apparatus”, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1018, 1025
(1981).
67. Id.
68. Bottazzi et al., The Importance of Trust, supra note 63, at 5.
69. Id.
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vestors may assume the role of reputational intermediaries with later
round investors and be perceived as parties with an attractive deal flow
because they are able to generate the greatest levels of cooperation and
value among start-up companies.  This status may send a signal to later
stage investors who are interested in investing in companies that show
high degrees of cooperation among the parties and who ultimately agree
to invest at a premium given the reputational effect.
Capitalizing on the investor-entrepreneur relationship requires a level
of cooperation between the parties that characterizes a relational contract.
Cooperation, however, may conflict with the natural incentives of either
party to seek greater personal benefit in the relationship to reduce their
perceived risk.70  For example, the entrepreneur may have incentives to
withhold information71 and to be uncooperative in the use of resources,72
while the investor may have incentives to be uncooperative in the provi-
sion or disbursement of funds.73  In other words, the entrepreneur may
withhold necessary information from the investor or the investor may dis-
count information provided by the entrepreneur as self-serving, particu-
larly in the valuation of the business.74  These conflicting incentives often
break down the level of cooperation and communication between the par-
ties and cause the parties to take adversarial positions, particularly during
the earliest stages of the relationship.75  Such an occurrence diminishes the
value of human and physical capital provided by the investor and hurts the
business venture over time.76  As such, it is important to undertake mea-
70. See generally Dmitry Khanin & Ofir Turel, Conflicts and Regrets in the Venture
Capitalist–Entrepreneur Relationship, J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jsbm.12114/abstract.
71. See Harry J. Sapienza & M. Audrey Korsgaard, Procedural Justice in Entrepreneur-
Investor Relations, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 544 (1996) (finding that entrepreneurs often have
incentives to withhold or misrepresent information to the venture capitalists).
72. See generally Daniel M. Cable & Scott Shane, A Prisoner’s Dilemma Approach to
Entrepreneur-Venture Capitalist Relationships, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 142 (1997) (demon-
strating that entrepreneurs may begin to focus on other activities that motivate opportunism
in the use of resources).
73. Dean A. Shepherd & Andrew Zacharakis, The Venture Capitalist-Entrepreneur
Relationship: Control, Trust and Confidence in Co-operative Behaviour, 3 VENTURE CAP.:
INT’L J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 129, 130 (2001) [hereinafter Shepard & Zackarakis] (“[Ven-
ture capitalists] typically do not receive a return on their investment until after the limited
partners (those that invested in the [venture capital] fund) have received their return. Such
an arrangement may tempt [venture capitalists] to harvest a venture (and obtain their profits)
rather than reinvest in the venture’s future products and development.”) (internal citations
omitted).
74. Id. at 129–130 (“While the information provided by entrepreneurs is typically dis-
counted by [venture capitalists], investments of venture capital (including later stage funding)
are directly related to the entrepreneur’s initial projections . . . .”). (internal citations
omitted)
75. See generally Cable & Shane, supra note 72.
76. See Harry J. Sapienza, When Do Venture Capitalists Add Value?, 7 J. BUS. VEN-
TURING 9, 9–10 (1992) (discussing the value that venture capitalists add to start-up ventures).
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sures to facilitate cooperation between investor and entrepreneur because
cooperation benefits both parties.
Cooperation is facilitated by an optimal combination of control and
trust in the investor-entrepreneur relationship.77 That is, cooperation re-
quires an understanding between the investor and the entrepreneur that is
characterized either through trust in the other party to carry out an activ-
ity related to the business or through an allocation of control to one party
over that particular activity or aspect of the business.78  As an essential
element of relational contract, trust entails one party offering support in
the procedures used by another party, without the need for strict control
mechanisms.79  Control, in contrast, is characteristic of discrete contrac-
tual relations and regards the formalized authority centered in one of the
parties, such as through detailed contractual arrangement and specific-
ity.80  In the investor-entrepreneur relationship, control is granted through
contractual provisions outlining the rights, authority, and obligations of a
party.81  Trust, on the other hand, results from various attributes of the
parties and the transaction, such as fit, fairness, commitment, and commu-
nication.82  Each of these trust components requires a level of reciprocity
between the parties whereby each party respects the decision-making abil-
ity and judgment of the other.83
Some research indicates that trust and control are substitutes,84 ob-
serving that the award of additional control to a party may act as a substi-
tute for trusting that party in the decision-making process.  As such, for
77. Shepherd & Zacharakis, supra note 73, at 139–40.
78. Id. at 129 (“The entrepreneur and the [venture capitalist] need to balance the level
of control and trust building mechanisms so that the optimal level of confidence in partner
co-operation can be achieved.”).
79. Sapienza & Korsgaard, supra note 71, at 547–68 (analyzing methods of building
trust in a business investment relationship.).
80. See Todd R. Zenger et al., Informal and Formal Organization in New Institutional
Economics, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 14–15 (Paul In-
gram & Brian S. Silverman eds., 2000) available at http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/zenger/
advances6u.pdf.
81. See Hellmann, supra note 7, at 60 (“Control rights matter either because they al-
low one party to make a decision in the presence of conflict of interest or because they affect
the threat points in any renegotiation. Control is important since it affects the noncon-
tractible behavior of the two contracting parties.”).
82. Shepherd & Zacharakis, supra note 73, at 135 (“[T]rust can be built by both parties
in [a]relationship by: (1) signaling commitment and consistency; (2) being fair and just; (3)
obtaining a good ‘fit’ with the partner; and (4) frequent and open communications.”).
83. See W. E. Douglas Creed & Raymond E. Miles, Trust in Organizations: A Concep-
tual Framework Linking Organizational Forms, Managerial Philosophies, and the Opportu-
nity Costs of Controls, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH
1638 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996) (supporting reciprocity as an impor-
tant element to building trust.).
84. Sim B. Sitkin & Nancy L. Roth, Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic
“Remedies” for Trust/Distrust, 4 ORG. SCI. 367, 375–79 (1993); see Cable & Shane, supra note
75, at 162–63, 171.
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each specific situation (or transaction) there is an optimal level of trust
and control.85  Other research indicates that trust and control are not per-
fect substitutes and that low levels of trust exist at low levels control.86  In
either event, a party’s level of trust will affect the amount of control de-
sired or demanded by the other party.87  Inequity in the level of control
afforded one party in turn affects the willingness of the parties to cooper-
ate in the business relationship.
C. Trust, Control, and Risk Mitigation
Prior research demonstrates that equity investors often require exten-
sive control rights that exceed the value of their equity investment to the
firm.88  These scenarios defeat the objective of establishing a relational
contract.  The use of control to dictate decision making in an equity trans-
action introduces yet another type of risk known as agency risk.  Agency
risk is the possibility that either party may act in their own interest to the
detriment of the other party’s interests.89  Agency theory focuses on a con-
trolled (often contractual) agency relationship to combat these incen-
tives.90  Pursuant to this view, the entrepreneur is an agent of the start-up
and investor shareholders and acts on their behalf when managing the bus-
iness venture.  The investor is drawn to an agency-based view of the rela-
tionship and accordingly may seek contractual provisions supporting this
view in an attempt to control the entrepreneur’s activities and reduce
opportunism.91
Given the relationship conflicts inherent in extensive control scenarios,
the efficacy of such an approach is uncertain, particularly as it pertains to
85. Shepherd & Zacharakis, supra note 73, at 139, (“It seems that there is some opti-
mal level of control that will allow trust in the relationship to develop and thereby generate
the maximum level of confidence in partner co-operation and the level of trust influences the
choice of control.”).
86. Id. (“There is a curvilinear relationship such that at low levels of control there will
be low levels of trust.”).
87. Id. (“It is proposed that an assessment of one’s current level of trust is likely to
directly influence the choice and magnitude of the control mechanisms implemented. In this
way the assessment of trust can act as a feedback mechanism informing the control decision
in order to fine tune the combination of trust and control towards an optimal level of confi-
dence in partner co-operation.”).
88. See Andrei A. Kirilenko, Valuation and Control in Venture Finance, 56 J. FIN. 565
(2001)
89. Shepherd & Zacharakis, supra note 73, at 132 (citing James O. Fiet, Reliance Upon
Informants in the Venture Capital Industry, 10 J. BUS. VENTURING 195 (1995) (“Agency risk
is the degree of uncertainty that either the entrepreneur or the [venture capitalist] will pursue
his or her own self interests rather than comply with the requirements of the contract for
venture capital.”).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 133 (“Agency theorists have provided valuable advice to [venture capitalists]
and implement control mechanisms to ensure that the entrepreneur does not act opportunis-
tically to the [venture capitalist’s] detriment.”)
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building trust between the parties.92  Attempting to mitigate a known risk
precipitates a discrete contractual relationship that may ultimately aug-
ment risk resulting from a lack of cooperation.  As an agent, the entrepre-
neur may feel subordinated and, perhaps, unduly beholden to the investor.
The entrepreneur endures the risk of inequitable decision making by the
principal (investor), such as removal as company CEO or dilution allowed
by control terms negotiated by the investor.  Relying on trust, on the other
hand, to dictate decision making in the venture transaction likewise engen-
ders an element of risk.93  The actions of either party, such as behavioral
inconsistency, lack of communication or forthrightness, inequitable con-
duct, or unwillingness to adjust to accommodate the other’s needs, erodes
any trust.94
As indicated, the conflicting risk perceptions between parties could re-
sult in disequilibrium that leads to a failed equity investment or an in-
creased probability of undesired business performance.  For example,
during the initial contracting stage, characterized by low ex ante levels of
trust, the venture capitalist will negotiate for high control terms in an early
round of financing.  The entrepreneur may perceive this high degree of
control as a lack of confidence or opportunistic behavior by the investor.
In turn, the parties may allow for contractual provisions that somewhat
offset the extensive control provisions.  One commonly used technique for
overcoming this limitation, which is discussed in greater detail below, is to
schedule the investment as a series of financing rounds that are contingent
upon certain metrics or milestones.  The earliest stages of venture capital
financing in this model occur during Series A financing rounds, with sub-
sequent rounds labeled Series B, C, D, and so on until the occurrence of a
liquidation event, such as the sale of the business or an initial public
offering.
Under the authors’ conceptual framework, the subjective risk percep-
tions of each party are taken as a given at the earliest stages of financing,
for example, during Series A financing.  Risk is mitigated by each party’s
level of trust in the other, which in the initial round of financing is mini-
mal.  Unwittingly, given this low level of trust, the parties may be prone to
bargain for the greatest control terms to protect themselves against their
subjective perceived risk.  One of three general scenarios will then result.
The first scenario is that the entrepreneur will forego control because capi-
tal is required to grow the business and a business failure would ensue
without the infusion of equity capital.  The result of the first scenario will
be a relationship with low levels of trust and highest chances of both entre-
preneur and investor opportunism.  The second scenario is that the entre-
preneur will dig in her heels and refuse to grant control while taking into
92. See Cable & Shane, supra note 75.
93. Shepherd & Zacharakis, supra note 73, at 135 (“Implicit in the emergence of trust
using this definition, is the necessary inclusion of some form of risk (perceived probability of
loss).”).
94. Id. at 135–37.
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consideration the high likelihood of failure.  The second scenario will
likely result in failure to obtain equity financing.  The third scenario is that
the sophisticated serial equity investor will make some minor concessions
to the entrepreneur in the form of contingent control terms.  This third
scenario may allay the entrepreneur’s perceived risks and allow the parties
to build relational contract that encourage increased trust during subse-
quent rounds of financing.  Ideally, term sheet provisions should be struc-
tured in a manner to accommodate this third scenario.
Figure 1 below provides a visual depiction of the constructs and their
relationships under the authors’ proposed conceptual model.  From this
theoretical vantage point, any term sheet negotiations that yield the result
of the third scenario will provide the best outcome among the three possi-
ble scenarios because it will lead to the best chance of building trust and a
relational contract among the parties and the greatest likelihood of coop-
eration, which will in the long term outweigh the concessions made by the
















FIGURE 1. TRUST-BUILDING CONCEPTUAL MODEL DURING VENTURE
CAPITAL EQUITY FINANCING
III. RISK-ALLOCATION TERMS
As introduced above, the level of control demanded and trust afforded
the other party directly affects cooperation between the entrepreneur and
investor.  In this pseudo-competitive and cooperative state known as
coopetition, the amount of control asserted by any party is directly related
to the risk perceived in the business venture.95  This Section explores the
allocation of control between the entrepreneur and investor through the
examination of select term sheet provisions.  Each term sheet provision
95. Tobias Kollmann et al., Trust and Controllability in Venture Capital Fundraising, 67
J. BUS. RES. 2411, 2411 (2014) (“Results suggest that trust and perceived controllability shape
the investment decisions of those LPs.”).
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identifies a type of perceived risk and the opportunity for one party to
allocate control or afford trust to the other party.96  The presence of con-
trol provisions therefore affects the level of cooperation between the par-
ties and, ultimately, influences relative value created through the ongoing
relationship.  These provisions demonstrate the applicability of the pro-
posed conceptual model by focusing on interplay of trust and control in
the negotiation of each provision.
A. Price of Equity (Valuation)
Equity investors seek a return on their investment through a future
exit event.97  Unlike a large company investor who seeks a routine divi-
dend,98 the start-up equity investor seeks to earn a return on her invest-
ment at a point in the future when the equity of the business is sold.99  For
example, the investor may envision recouping her investment and earning
a profit by selling her equity investment to a future round of investors,
selling it back to the business, or selling it to public investors through an
initial public offering of the business’ stock.100  Therefore, equity investors
will only invest in a business that has potential to achieve a certain termi-
nal value.101  The terminal value must be sufficient to compensate the in-
vestor for the risk incurred for investing in the business.102
The amount of money an investor is willing to invest depends greatly
upon the present valuation attributed to the business.103  Present valua-
96. See Yixi Ning, et al., The Driving Forces of Venture Capital Investments, 44 SMALL
BUS. ECON. 315 (2014) (providing background reading on the macroeconomic and market
factors (risk factors) affecting venture capital investment decisions).
97. De Clercq, et al., supra note 8, at 92 (“The preferential exit mechanisms for the
[venture capitalist] are an initial public offering (IPO) and trade sale. The route to exit is
preferably planned before the investment is made.”).
98. See generally, Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth,
and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J.  BUS. 411 (1961) (providing a detailed analysis of the effect
and drivers of dividend policies of corporate firms).
99. De Clercq et al., supra note 8, at 95 (“The [venture capitalists’] goal in the pre-
investment phase is to make an investment in a venture that offers the potential for signifi-
cant long-term capital gains . . . and offer[s] an exit opportunity in three to seven years after
the investment.”) (internal citations omitted).
100. Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 46, at 317 (“Exit may be accomplished through
the sale or distribution of the venture capitalist’s shares during or after an initial public offer-
ing (IPO) or acquisition of the portfolio company by another company. The portfolio com-
pany may also redeem the shares of the venture capitalist on demand pursuant to a
contractual put right. Or, the venture capitalist may receive a cash distribution upon the
liquidation of the portfolio company.”) (internal citations omitted).
101. De Clercq et al., supra note 8, at 95 (“The [venture capitalists’] . . . target rates of
return are about 30 to 60 percent per annum . . . and offer an exit opportunity in three to
seven years after the investment.”) (internal citations omitted); Avi Messica, The Valuation
of Cash-Flowless High-Risk Ventures, 11 J. PRIV. EQUITY 43, 43 (2008).
102. See Jonathan B. Berk et al., Valuation and Return Dynamics of New Ventures, 17
REV. FIN. STUD. 1 (2004) (proposing a model capturing the sources of risk in determining the
value and risk premium of the venture).
103. Messica, supra note 101, at 43–48.
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tion is split into two categories: pre-money valuation and post-money valu-
ation.104  The pre-money valuation is the value attributed to the firm prior
to infusing any new capital.105  The post-money valuation is the value of
the firm immediately following the infusion of capital.106  Dividing the
amount of money invested in the business by the post-money valuation
generally results in the percentage of the business that the investor will
own following the investment, often referred to as the investor’s equity
interest.107
Post-Money Valuation = Pre-Money Valuation + Invested Capital
% Investor Equity Ownership = Invested Capital / Post-Money Valuation
 The question then becomes: how do the entrepreneur and investor arrive
at an appropriate value or percentage of business equity to exchange for
the investor’s funds?  Historically, investors have used a litany of different
methods to value a business, including industry or transaction com-
parables, a net present value calculation, an adjusted present value calcu-
lation, or the venture capital method.108
The aptly named venture capital method is the most common method
used in the angel and venture capital investment industry.109  This method
employs future cash flow projections and industry multiples to arrive at
the value of the business at a future point in time, namely the time of
exit.110  The investor then uses the amount of the proposed investment
and the perceived risk of the investment to determine the amount of re-
turn required for the investment.111  The amount of return required by the
investor divided by the value of the business at the time of exit is equal to
the percentage of the business that the investor will require for her invest-
ment.112  Once the investor and entrepreneur agree on a projected valua-
tion for the business at the intended time of exit, the negotiation begins to
determine the purchase price per share.113
104. PAUL GOMPERS, & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 90-91 (MIT




108. Id. at 92 (listing investment valuation techniques and the positive and negative
attributes of each); see also Messica, supra note 101, at 45–48 (explaining common valuation
methods).
109. Messica, supra note 101, at 105.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 106.
113. See Robert H. Keeley, Sanjeev Punjabi, & Lassaad Turki, Valuation of Early-stage
Ventures: Option Valuation Models vs. Traditional Approaches, 5 J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN.
115, 121 (1996), (explaining the venture capital method and the determination of purchase
price per share based upon the desired percentage ownership of the company).
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Investors normally seek a return equal to some multiple of their initial
investment114 or seek to achieve a specific internal rate of return based
upon the level of perceived risk.115  The riskier the investment, the greater
the return the investor will seek.  The valuation attributed to a business
and the amount of equity offered in exchange for funds by each side is
directly related to the amount of risk that the party perceives in the busi-
ness venture.116  That is, the investor will seek a rate of return from the
investment consistent with her perceived risk in the failure or un-
derperformance of the venture.  Uncertainty about the characteristics of
the entrepreneurial venture affects the valuation and magnifies the risk
associated with the valuation method.
Conflicting valuations can diminish trust between the parties.117  In a
situation where parties hope to agree on a valuation, uncertainty by either
party gives rise to a perception of risk and necessitates a higher level of
control to diminish that risk.  The investor hopes to achieve the results
predicted by the entrepreneur, but benefits at this stage of negotiation
from asserting a lower performance by the venture through a lower valua-
tion.  This state of coopetition may cause the investor to place greater
weight on individual risk factors when attributing a valuation to the busi-
ness.  These competing interests play out as control or trust in the entre-
preneur-investor relationship.
A lower valuation is effectively a control provision that reduces the
likelihood of financial loss in the venture.118  Trust in the entrepreneur’s
valuation, however, demonstrates less concern for existing risk factors and
may result in a higher pre-money valuation of the business venture.119  In
either case, the amount of money invested does not change; rather, the
variation relates to the percentage of ownership allocated to the investor
and the entrepreneur after the investment.120  Attributing a lower or
higher valuation does not necessarily affect the potential of the firm;
114. An investor making a high-risk investment in an early stage company may require
a 30x return on their investment at the time of exit. This means that if the projected future
value of the business is $3 million at time of exit, then the investor would only invest $30,000
for 100% of the equity ownership and $15,000 for 50% of the equity ownership.
115. See Sophie Manigart et al, Determinants of Required Return in Venture Capital
Investments: A Five-Country Study, 17 J. BUS. VENTURING 291 (2002) (exploring the rate or
return required by venture capitalists based upon multiple risk factors at various stages of
venture development).
116. See Messica, supra note 101, at 43–44.
117. Shepherd & Zacharakis, supra note 73, at 142–43 (“Perceived fairness most often
focuses on valuation and equity dilution to secure funding. Valuation is often highly conten-
tious primarily because of a lack of information.”).
118. See Messica, supra note 101, at 44 (noting the methods of firm valuation for start-
up ventures derive from the uncertainty in the venture performance).
119. David H. Hsu, What Do Entrepreneurs Pay for Venture Capital Affiliation? 59 J.
FIN. 1805, 1807 (2004) (noting that highly desirable venture capitalists generally receive a
10–14% discount on the valuation of equity).
120. See GOMPERS, & LERNER, supra note 104, at 91 (illustrating the calculation of
ownership percentage based upon pre-money and post-money valuations).
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rather it affects the level of cooperation between the parties, which in turn
affects the firm’s performance.  For example, a lower valuation will reduce
the potential gain for the entrepreneur from an exit event due to the en-
trepreneur’s reduced equity ownership percentage.  This scenario may re-
duce the entrepreneur’s incentive to maximize venture performance,
which works to the detriment of all parties as venture performance
diminishes.
As discussed above, settling upon a valuation aptly demonstrates the
potential outcomes of the trust-control interplay within this pseudo-com-
petitive relationship.  In the first scenario, the entrepreneur will allow the
investor greater control in valuation by accepting a lower valuation or a
higher required return by the investor, resulting in a relationship with low
levels of trust and highest chances of entrepreneur opportunism.121  For
example, the entrepreneur may feel that she is being taken advantage of in
the transaction.  As such, an investor who pushes for a low valuation based
upon the perceived level of risk in the investment risks creating mistrust
and reducing the level of cooperation from the entrepreneur in the opera-
tions or strategic decision making.122  In the second scenario, the entrepre-
neur will refuse to concede a given level of control to the investor by
arguing for a lower valuation or rejecting the investor’s required return on
investment.123  If the investor is unwilling to accept these terms, the situa-
tion may result in a failure of the funding deal.  In the third scenario, the
equity investor consciously forgoes the desire for greater control over the
valuation or valuation method in order to build trust in the current and
future rounds of financing.124  In such a scenario, other term sheet provi-
sions may serve to reduce the investor’s perceived risk in a lower valuation
while preserving the level of cooperation between the parties.  For exam-
ple, a valuation term sheet item that takes the risky nature of early stage
valuation into account and minimizes the risk exposure through gradual
investments and fair valuation methods will allow trust and a relational
contract to develop over time.
The risk allocation effect of attributing a higher or lower valuation to a
business venture necessitates a method for maximizing venture perform-
ance through valuation.  To achieve this objective, each party must work
to understand the subjective risk perceived by the other party when em-
121. See Rosalined H. Woolthuis et al., Trust, Contract and Relationship Development,
26 ORG. STUDIES 813, 814 (2005) (“The active form of opportunism entails ‘interest seeking
with guile’; lying, stealing and cheating to expropriate advantage from a partner. The absence
of such active opportunism is called ‘benevolence’ or ‘goodwill’. Thus, intentional trust has
two dimensions: trust in dedication and trust in benevolence/ goodwill.”) (internal citation
omitted).
122. See Cable & Shane, supra note 75, at 142–76 (employing the prisoner’s dilemma
framework to demonstrate that the nature of the entrepreneur-investor relationship can cre-
ate incentives that affect the level of cooperation in the relationship, which ultimately affects
the decision making of the parties).
123. See infra, Section II.C, paragraph 4.
124. Id.
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ploying any valuation method.  Such understanding may heighten the co-
operation between the parties and diminish the heightened control
measures employed through the competitive negotiation process.
B. Risk as it Relates to the Amount and Timing of Investment
Risk preference affects both the amount of money that an investor is
willing to invest and the amount that an entrepreneur seeks in equity in-
vestment.125  Procedurally, each party understands that early equity in-
vestment in a start-up venture is very costly to the entrepreneur and very
uncertain for the investor.126 The uncertainty of financial success of the
venture causes early investors to seek higher returns on the investment
and, thus, lower valuations for the equity purchased.127  As the venture
performs and accumulates assets, outside financing generally becomes
cheaper and more easily available.128  In turn, the lower risk of business
failure at later stages of growth diminishes the investor’s required rate of
return.129  However, at early stages of a new venture, the entrepreneur
faces the risk of over-diluting her ownership too early in the life of the
business.  A lower valuation at an early stage requires that the entrepre-
neur sell a greater share of equity to the investor to meet business capital
needs.130
The parties allocate the above-stated risk by placing limits on the
amount and timing of the equity investment.131  For example, the parties
125. De Clercq et al., supra note 8, at 99 (“[I]n early stage ventures, the actual equity
received for a given level of investment is much more likely to be determined by prevailing
norms than any actual calculation of realistically expected future cash flows. In essence, the
[venture capitalist] needs to believe that the target rate of return has a reasonable chance of
being reached within her required time to exit.”); see also Amit et al., supra note 5 (noting
that more successful firms generally defer involvement of outside capital).
126. De Clercq et al., supra note 8, at 99 (“With multiple investors involved and with
great future uncertainty, the end result is that [venture capitalists] generally receive signifi-
cant ownership stakes in their ventures, especially in those receiving money in early stages.”).
127. Balasubramanian Elango et al., How Venture Capital Firms Differ, 10 J. BUS VEN-
TURING 157, 157 (1995) (“Earlier stage investors sought ventures with higher potential re-
turns—a 42% hurdle rate of return for the earliest stage investor versus 33% for the late-
stage investor.”); see generally John H. Cochrane, supra note 51.
128. Cuny & Talmor, supra note 21, at 3 (citing Darwin V. Neher, Staged Financing: An
Agency Perspective, 66 REV. ECON. STUDIES 255, 255–74 (1999) (“[A]s human capital is grad-
ually transformed to physical capital, the venture increases the value of its collateral, hence
makes outside financing more affordable.”).
129. De Clercq et al., supra note 8, at 100 (“[T]he entrepreneur will end up with a larger
share because the required IRR for the [venture capitalist’s] investment is typically lower in
later rounds as the level of risk decreases (i.e., the valuation of the company goes up in
subsequent rounds), thus shifting investment to a later round lowers dilution.”).
130. D. Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture Capital Financing, 24 J. CORP. L.
949, 968 (1999) [hereinafter Smith, Team Production] (“Another danger is that subsequent
rounds of financing may substantially dilute the Entrepreneur’s interest in the company.”).
131. See Cuny & Talmor, supra note 21, at 6–10 (providing a mathematical model for
allocating the amount and timing of funding through milestone financing).
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may seek to invest a certain amount of capital in a given equity round or,
in the alternative, agree to invest funds at various milestones or points in
the business lifecycle.132  With regard to the timing of investment, the use
of single-event or milestone financing demonstrates the spectrum of risk
allocation between the parties.  Milestone financing involves investing at
various stages of the business’ development and helps the parties to build
trust.133  It allocates a higher level of performance risk to the entrepreneur
because the venture must reach given milestones before receiving a certain
level of funding from the investor.134  Such a scenario may affect the en-
trepreneur’s decision making and the goals she sets for the venture.  In
turn, later stage financing may reduce the risk to the investor by incen-
tivizing the entrepreneur’s efforts.135
Staging capital can serve as a method by which an investor controls the
development of a start-up venture.136  In fact, staged financing is often one
of the strongest control techniques a venture capitalist exercises over
early-stage start-ups.137  It is common for investors to use future financing
stages as leverage to exercise additional controls over the business.138
Staged financing provides protection for investors from losses when the
venture is not going well;139 however, it can put the investor in a greater
position of control by way of this potential holdup position.140  Further,
stage financing may allow the investor to acquire majority control of vot-
ing shares after multiple stages of financing.141  When negotiating the tim-
ing of financing, the willingness of each party to trust or allow the other
132. Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 46, at 323 (“Staged financing occurs when venture
capitalists invest incrementally in their portfolio companies.”).
133. Id. at 323–24.
134. See Smith, Team Production, supra note 130, at 966 (“Staged financing [is] the
practice of investing only enough money to allow the Entrepreneur to progress to the next
milestone in its business plan.”).
135. Cuny & Talmor, supra note 21, at 3 (“[A] commitment to syndicate financing in
later stages reduces the entrepreneur’s under provision of effort.”) (citation omitted).
136. See Sahlman, supra note 42, at 506 (“The most important mechanism for control-
ling the venture is staging the infusion of capital.”).
137. Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 46, at 324 (“They are more important to the bal-
ance of control in the early lives of most venture-backed companies than the redemption
rights and the registration rights discussed in Part II because other rights are typically not
available to venture capitalists for a period of years after the initial investment.”).
138. Id. at 323 (“If the venture capitalists want to wrest control from an entrepreneur,
they may demand majority board control in exchange for additional financing.”).
139. Id.
140. Neher, supra note 128, at 255–56; see also Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integra-
tion, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297,
298–302 (1978).
141. Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 46, at 324 (citing Steven N. Kaplan & Per
Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of
Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 288 (2003) (“Staged financing also typi-
cally involves the staged acquisition of control. More often than not, venture capitalists do
not acquire a majority of the votes in the initial round of financing.”)).
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party control may cause either party to limit or expand the offering to a
certain size.  These considerations become particularly important when
the investor tries to pressure the entrepreneur into dealing solely with the
investor’s firm in the present or a future equity funding transaction.  In
such exclusivity scenarios, trust may be compromised given the leverage
the investor has gained.
Milestone financing also includes an element of trust because it may
increase the risk of lower returns to the investor.142  The amount of equity
purchased in later financial rounds is generally more expensive or costly
per share, so the investor receives less equity (a lower number of shares)
for their investment.143  Similarly, a single round of financing presents an
increased risk of loss to the investor.  A single round requires more funds
from the investor at a more uncertain point in the business lifecycle.144  As
such, it allocates the risk of higher losses to the investor early in the
relationship.
The preferable position for the investor with regard to the timing of
financing depends upon her perception of risk of loss versus the percep-
tion of the risk of lower returns.  As for the entrepreneur, a single round
of financing increases risk by raising the cost of the investment (selling
more equity at a lower equity valuation).145  Milestone financing poses the
risk that the investor will elect to not invest the needed capital at a future
point if she perceives the risk to be too high.
The typical entrepreneur is overly confident in her venture’s prospects
and excessively averse to the risk of distributing too many shares at an
early stage.  She may, therefore, view milestone funding in a favorable
light.  Generally, the entrepreneur’s objective is to receive the greatest
value for the least equity, with the lowest milestone threshold.146  This
may contrast with an investor who has significant confidence that the busi-
ness will meet its financial goals.  In such a case, the investor would want
to acquire a greater percentage of equity at a lower valuation, leading to a
preference for single round financing and a lower level of trust between
the parties.
142. See generally Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 46.
143. See Michael Woronoff & Jonathan Rosen, Understanding Anti-Dilution Provisions
in Convertible Securities, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 136 (2005) (explaining economic dilution
resulting from a drop in the value of shares in later rounds); see also GOMPERS & LERNER,
supra note 104, at 91 (providing for the calculation of ownership percentage under the ven-
ture capital method based upon the size of the investment divided by the post-money valua-
tion of the business).
144. See Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 46, at 324 (“Staged investments typically oc-
cur over a relatively short time period, almost always less than one year apart and frequently
at much shorter intervals.”).
145. This assumes that the start-up venture rises in value over time, which is generally a
requirement for follow-on financing to take place.
146. De Clercq et al., supra note 8, at 100 (“[E]ntrepreneurs are faced with ‘conflicting’
objectives when negotiating a deal structure with an investor i.e., to give up as little equity as
possible, to get as much cash as possible and to set milestone hurdles as low as possible.”).
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While the investor may wish to minimize downside risk, the effect of
signaling a lack of confidence in the business venture may diminish the
entrepreneur’s motivation or incentivize self-serving behavior.  Again, in
an early state of coopetition, it is important to minimize control provisions
that have the effect of prejudicing the overall performance of the venture.
For example, if the entrepreneur perceives investor hold-up as a substan-
tial risk, she may abandon the funding transaction or accept the investor
control provision.  Abandoning the transaction generally works to the det-
riment of both parties.  Proceeding with the transaction, however, may
lead to low levels of trust and higher likelihood of entrepreneur opportu-
nism in decision making.  In any event, the pseudo-competitive state dic-
tates the need to cede a level of control to the entrepreneur that fits within
the investor’s risk propensity and is consistent with the entrepreneur’s per-
ception of risk in the timing and amount of investment.  The strength of
either party’s awareness of or preference for the risks associated with tim-
ing and amount will drive the parties’ objectives (control versus trust) dur-
ing negotiation.
C. Security Features
The type of security instrument chosen for an investment transaction
represents a form of structural control achieved through allocation of own-
ership rights attributable to a type or class of security.147  Start-ups seeking
funding from equity investors are generally organized as corporations.148
The corporate form allows for ease and certainty in issuance of alternative
classes of equity instruments to provide to investors in exchange for their
investment funds.149  The following section describes the various types of
equity instruments used in venture financing and their primary character-
istics.  The attributes of each type of equity instrument serve as control
provisions that allow for a unique risk allocation between the investor and
entrepreneur.
Common stock is the basic type of equity that exists for every corpo-
rate entity.150  A share of stock generally entitles the owner to one vote
for shareholder matters under state law or as outlined under the governing
147. See Sheridan Titman, The Effect of Capital Structure on a Firm’s Liquidation Deci-
sion, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 137, 137–51 (1984) (demonstrating how the capital structure control
liquidation decisions within the firm).
148. See Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-
ups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137, 137 (2003) (“A typical start-up is organized as a corporation under
state law, which means that it is treated as a separate entity from its owners for tax
purposes.”).
149. Note that C-Corporation status allows for various classes of common and pre-
ferred stock. S-Corporation status limits the corporation to one form of stock, with limited
exception for a class of non-voting common stock.
150. ALEX WILMERDING, TERM SHEETS & VALUATIONS: A LINE-BY-LINE LOOK AT
THE INTRICACIES OF TERM SHEETS & VALUATIONS 36 (2003).
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documents.151  Founders generally receive common stock at the formation
of the corporation,152 while new additions to the corporate team may re-
ceive common stock or options to purchase common stock as an employ-
ment incentive.153  Common shares that are used as incentive
compensation will generally vest over a period of time.154  In the case that
an employee is fired or leaves the business, the employee may not yet have
vested in all of her stock award.  This reduces risk to the business venture
by protecting against situations where it is forced to repurchase a large
number of outstanding shares.  For reasons discussed below, common
stock is rarely used in equity funding transactions with outside investors.
Venture capital investors will generally require a form of preferred
stock for their investment.155  Preferred stock, as the name denotes, be-
stows special rights upon the holder beyond those of common stock.156
Notably, preferred stock provides the shareholder with priority over re-
sources as stipulated by this security.157  For example, if the investor ac-
cepts common stock for her investment, she risks suffering a loss while the
entrepreneur benefits from an early exit event.158  As with any financing
relationship, the extent of priority afforded the preferred shareholder in a
start-up venture is the subject of negotiation between the entrepreneur
and investor.  Many of the attributes of preferred stock are control terms
that mitigate investor risk in a low trust context and allow for negotiation
of numerous control mechanisms within the investment relationship.
The attributes common in preferred shares of a start-up venture, but
not necessarily present in the preferred shares of a public company, are
discussed in the subsections that follow.
151. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 15 (Harvard Univ. Press
2000).
152. WILMERDING, supra note 150.
153. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in
Startups, 81 NYU L. REV. 967, 1010 (2006).
154. See GOMPERS, & LERNER, supra note 104, at 139 (providing an overview of vesting
of equity awards); see, e.g., TOM TAULLI, HOW TO CREATE THE NEXT FACEBOOK 20–21
(2012) (demonstrating a situation where equity incentives vest on a schedule).
155. Sridhar Arcot, Participating Convertible Preferred Stock in Venture Capital Exits,
29 J. BUS. VENTURING 72, 73 (2013) (“PCP stock is routinely used in venture capital con-
tracts. [Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 141] report that nearly 80% of all venture contracts
use convertible preferred stock and that in nearly half of those cases the stock is
participating.”).
156. See generally id.
157. See id. at 72–75 (providing an overview of the shareholder rights provided in pre-
ferred convertible shares).
158. For example, if the investor invests $1,000,000 in exchange for 50% of the business
and the entrepreneur simply invests time and effort, then the entrepreneur may have the
incentive to seek an early exit that benefits her but not the investor. The entrepreneur could
agree to sell the business for any value below $2,000,000. In such a case, the investor would
either break even or lose money on the deal, while the entrepreneur would receive nearly all
of the benefit.
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1. Conversion Rights
The most commonly used type of equity in venture financing is the
convertible preferred share.159  Conversion rights refer to the ability of the
preferred shareholder to convert her shares into common stock if holding
common shares would be more advantageous to the shareholder than
owning the preferred shares.160  For example, at the time of exit or sale,
the preferred shares may yield a return that is lower than the return from
the equivalent amount of common stock.161  In such a situation, the inves-
tor will have the incentive to convert her preferred shares into common
stock to take advantage of the higher return.162  As such, conversion pro-
visions mitigate investor risk of loss from holding the preferred shares,
while preserving the advantages of holding the preferred shares.
Conversion rights may also serve a risk mitigation function for the en-
trepreneur.  Conversion of preferred shares is generally at the option of
the preferred shareholder, but also automatic at some point or upon some
event.163  As previously stated, optional conversion will generally occur
when the value of the common stock exceeds the benefits or return associ-
ated with preferred shares.  An automatic-conversion clause, on the other
hand, calls for preferred stock to be automatically converted to common
stock upon some event, such as making the filings necessary for an initial
public offering.164  Thresholds for automatic conversion are fixed control
points and are important points of negotiation.  An entrepreneur generally
wants lower thresholds for conversion (such as a given revenue point) in
order to provide for flexibility when seeking an exit event, while investors
may claim additional control by seeking higher thresholds.
Negotiation of a specific event or threshold for conversion represents
an effort to mitigate one party’s perceived risk.  It recognizes that any such
event or threshold represents the opportunity for one party to act oppor-
tunistically at the expense of the venture or the other party.  In an absence
of trust in the other party’s actions, one party will seek to use conversion
rights to control the actions of the other party.  While any level of control
may reduce the amount of cooperation in the relationship, a certain level
of control that does not enter into the other party’s view as a perceived
risk may facilitate a cooperative relationship.
159. See Arcot, supra note 155; see also Paul A. Gompers, Ownership and Control in
Entrepreneurial Firms: An Examination of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital Invest-
ments 3, 13 (1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
160. WILMERDING, supra note 150, at 49.
161. See Arcot, supra note 155, at 74.
162. See id.
163. Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 46, at 354 (“Generally speaking, venture capital
investments contain two types of conversion provisions: (1) optional conversion which allows
the venture capitalist to convert at will; and (2) automatic conversion which requires the
venture capitalist to convert upon the occurrence of specified events, most importantly an
[initial public offering].”).
164. Id.
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2. Liquidation Preferences
A liquidation preference grants the investor priority in recuperating
her investment if the business is sold or undergoes some other exit
event.165  Liquidation preferences are closely connected with conversion
rights. Generally, an investor will not convert preferred shares to common
shares when the value of the common shares is less than the liquidation
preference amount.166  Conversely, if the value of the preferred shares
when converted to common stock exceeds the liquidation preference, then
the investor has an incentive to convert the shares.167  The liquidation
preference protects the investor against early exits that fail to capture the
anticipated value of the business venture by allowing the investor to be
compensated (or receive a return on capital) before the entrepreneur re-
ceives any funds from the exit event.168  The liquidation preference often
goes beyond simply assuring a return of the investor’s funds—it may re-
turn some multiple of the initial investment.169  This means the investor
will get some multiple of their liquidation preference if the business goes
through an exit event.
A liquidation preference is a security measure that mitigates the inves-
tor’s risk of financial loss relative to other shareholders, including the en-
trepreneur.  While generally understood to mitigate risk for the investor
and shift that risk onto the entrepreneur, a liquidation preference protects
against opportunism by the entrepreneur in seeking an exit event that
does not benefit the investor.  Contrary to the cooperative state desired in
a relationship contract, the entrepreneur might interpret this provision as
demonstrating a lack of trust.  While the investor perceives a risk of loss or
opportunism by the entrepreneur, the liquidation preference may increase
the incentive for other forms of opportunism and lack of cooperation. De-
pending on how the entrepreneur perceives the risk-shifting effect of the
liquidation preference, the investor’s perception of risk may thwart the
common objective—creating value in the firm.
165. See WILMERDING, supra note 150, at 44.
166. Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 46, at 355 (“Timothy Harris [Timothy J. Harris,
Modeling the Conversion Decisions of Preferred Stock, 58 BUS. LAW. 587 (2003)], has
modeled the ‘conversion decision’ facing venture capitalists in the context of an acquisition,
and he shows why venture capitalists will not convert their preferred shares into common
shares when the acquisition price is less than or equal to the total value of the liquidation
preferences.”).
167. Id. (“The ‘conversion point’ for venture capitalists comes when the acquisition
price is large enough that venture capitalists benefit from conversion, that is, when that value
that venture capitalists would receive from holding common stock exceeds the value of their
liquidation preference and any participation rights.”).
168. Id. at 348 (“The liquidation preference ensures a modicum of protection against
misappropriation because it must be paid prior to any payments being made to the entrepre-
neur, and the participation provision deters the controlling entrepreneur from upside exits,
that is, exits that may seem favorable to the entrepreneur but not the venture capitalist.”).
169. GOMPERS, & LERNER, supra note 104, at 129 (explaining the use of liquidation
preferences as a means of compensating the venture investor).
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3. Participation Rights
 Participation rights give shareholders (including the entrepreneur) the
right to participate in receiving any distributions from the business.170  The
participating shareholder receives a percentage of the funds distributed
that is equal to her percentage of equity ownership.171  As stated above,
participation rights generally arise in the context of a liquidation prefer-
ence.  If the investor reserves a liquidation preference, she may also de-
mand the right to participate in any distributions above the liquidation
preference.172  The terms of the liquidation preference may allow the en-
trepreneur to “catch up” before the investor receives any amount above
the liquidation preference.173  While participation rights are often com-
bined with a liquidation preference, an unlimited participation right is gen-
erally seen as overly generous to the investor and participation rights are
therefore frequently capped.174
Taken together, liquidation preferences, conversion rights, and partici-
pation rights are all control mechanisms used to allocate risk in the
pseudo-competitive relationship between investor and entrepreneur.  The
presence and characteristics of each provision mitigates investor risk and
shifts that risk to the entrepreneur.  Perhaps most importantly, all of these
provisions signal a reduced role of trust in the entrepreneur-investor rela-
tionship that thwarts the relationship characteristics desired in the agree-
ment and may deter the entrepreneur who works in an underperforming
business.  In negotiations, the investor must balance the perceived risks
addressed by the preferred rights against the entrepreneur’s perception of
fairness and the potentially negative affect of these provisions on firm per-
formance.  An entrepreneur should be willing to cede preferred rights to
the investor based upon the extent of the investor’s perceived risk.  Failure
to do so could result in diminished cooperation and lost venture value.
170. Arcot, supra note 155, at 73 (“ Participation rights entitle the [venture capitalist],
in the event of sale or liquidation, to a liquidation preference plus a pro rata share of what
remains to be paid to common shareholders. Thus, upon sale or liquidation, participating
preferred shareholders have a debt-like claim equal to their liquidation preference plus a
common shareholder’s claim. In contrast, holders of nonparticipating convertible preferred
shares either receive the liquidation preference payable on the preferred stock or they con-
vert their shares to common stock and share pro rata with common shareholders.”).
171. See id.; Harris, supra note 166, at 590 (explaining that participating preferred stock
is often subject to a cap on compensation after receipt of the liquidation preference).
172. See GOMPER, & LERNER, supra note 104, at 129, 131.
173. See id. at 129.
174. Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 46, at 347 (“In success scenarios, the combination
of a liquidation preference plus an uncapped participation right is sometimes viewed by en-
trepreneurs as excessively generous to the venture capitalists. As a result, many venture capi-
tal deals cap the participation rights.”); see also GOMPERS, & LERNER, supra note 104, at
128–30. If a liquidation preference exists and participation right is not capped, then combin-
ing participation rights with an optional conversion provision is largely useless. Id. An inves-
tor will not have a financial incentive to convert their shares into common shares. Id. The
participation rights, however, are often capped. Id. This reality leads to prevalence of pre-
ferred convertible participating shares in equity funding transactions. Id.
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D. Other Common Term Sheet Provisions
The following Section discusses common provisions found in term
sheets that address and seek to allocate specific risks perceived by the in-
vestor and the entrepreneur.  The extent of the protection afforded by
each provision varies based on the level of protection required by a party
and the trust afforded the other party.
1. Redemption Rights
Redemption occurs when a business repurchases shares from the busi-
ness’s equity holders.175  Redemption rights are generally either optional
or mandatory.176  Optional redemption facilitates the venture capitalist’s
desire to exit a venture when the value created from any additional capital
is approximately equal to the amount of new capital invested.177  It is a
foreseeable risk, however, that the firm will not grow and develop suffi-
ciently to return the investor’s capital (along with any interest or preferred
returns) during the projected investment period.  A demand redemption
right is a strong control provision that minimizes the investor’s risk of be-
coming stuck in a failing business.178 A demand redemption right also al-
lows the investor to control the entrepreneur’s ability to seek an early exit
from the venture,179 which could result in a failure of the business to meet
the investor’s expectations for returns.  At the same time, these rights aug-
ment the risk to the entrepreneur that the investor will effectively bank-
rupt the business by demanding a return of capital through a repurchase of
her shares.
175. Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 46, at 348 (“Redemption is a term that may cover
many types of provisions. At its most general, redemption refers to any repurchase of shares
by the company for an amount specified in the contract.”).
176. Id. (“Venture capital transactions may have up to three different redemption pro-
visions: (1) mandatory redemption, (2) optional investor redemption (put), and (3) optional
company redemption (call).”).
177. Id. at 345 (“Venture capitalists and entrepreneurs may have incentives to pursue
different exit strategies. Douglas Cumming and Jeffrey MacIntosh sensibly suggest that ven-
ture capitalists will exit from an investment when the projected marginal value added by the
venture capitalist’s efforts equals the projected cost of those efforts.”).
178. Id. at 348–49 (citing Lee F. Benton et al., Hi-Tech Corporation: Amended and
Restated Certificate of Incorporation, in MICHAEL J. HALLORAN ET AL., 1 VENTURE CAPITAL
& PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION 8-1, 8-18 to 8-27 (Michael J. Halloran, et al. eds. 3d ed.
1997 & Supp. 2004)) (“Just interpreting the facial terms, the purpose of these provisions
would appear to be twofold: to provide the venture capitalist with the means to extract the
original investment from a company that seems unlikely to succeed; and to provide the ven-
ture capitalist with leverage over the entrepreneur based on the credible threat of
withdrawal.”).
179. Id. at 340 (“[V]enture capitalists and entrepreneurs usually structure their relation-
ships in a manner that affords entrepreneurs some freedom from the threat of exit by venture
capitalists at the beginning of the relationship and transfers greater control over exit deci-
sions to venture capitalists as time passes. This is accomplished through several types of con-
tractual provisions: (1) negative covenants (also known as “protective provisions”); (2)
redemption (put) rights; (3) demand registration rights; and (4) conversion rights.”).
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Mandatory redemption, in contrast to demand redemption, normally
occurs at a stated time, upon a specific occurrence, or staggered over a
period of time.180  If the business has not reached a point where it can sell
or otherwise liquidate investor interest, the investor has the right to force
the business to redeem some or all of the investor’s shares, assuming the
business has sufficient assets.181  While mandatory redemption imputes a
level of decision making by the investor at a given point in time, it lacks
the extensive control afforded by the demand right.  While the mandatory
redemption provision is a risk allocation provision in favor of the investor,
it reduces the level of control of the investor in determining when redemp-
tion occurs.
These control mechanisms demonstrate a distinct disparity in the inten-
tions of the entrepreneur and the investor.  While the entrepreneur seeks
to continue growing the business, redemptions rights stand to thwart that
growth in the event the investor either chooses to exit or the business fails
to achieve certain growth goals that call for mandatory redemption.  Re-
demption rights may also create a risk to the entrepreneur’s ability to at-
tract future investors because any future invested funds could be used to
redeem the earlier investor rather than to grow the business.182  While
redemption rights serve to protect the investor against the perceived risks
of business failure or a premature exit event, the entrepreneur perceives
the investor’s redemption right as a risk shifting mechanism demonstrating
the investor’s lack of trust in the entrepreneur’s intentions or in the busi-
ness venture’s performance.  Consistent with other control and risk alloca-
tion provisions, these provisions can defeat the intention of developing a
relational contract by affecting the entrepreneur’s decision making and de-
creasing the level of cooperation between the parties.
2. Registration Rights
Registration rights allow an investor to force the business to file a re-
gistration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and state regulators.183  They are generally categorized as piggyback or
demand registration rights.184  Piggyback rights allow an investor to par-
180. Id. at 348 (“Mandatory redemption requires the company to begin repurchasing
shares at a specified date, usually subject to waiver by the venture capitalists. Such redemp-
tions could be staggered over a period of months or years to lessen the impact on the
company.”).
181. Id. at 348–49.
182. Id. at 349 (“Indeed, such provisions may dissuade future investors from providing
additional capital for the simple reason that the capital may be used to finance the redemp-
tion rather than the operations of the firm.”).
183. WILMERDING, supra note 150, at 64–65.
184. Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 46, at 344 (citing Phillippe Aghion et al., Exit
Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity Versus Incentives, 8 REV. FIN. 327, 348 (2004)) (“If
[venture capital] investors hold a minority stake their exit will depend on decisions reached
by majority shareholders. Therefore [venture capital] investors often require a registration
rights agreement giving them the right either to have their shares included in an [initial public
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ticipate in any registration of the business’ securities.185  That is, if another
class of security holder registers a class security, then the investor with
piggy back registration rights can also participate in that registration.186
Demand rights, on the other hand, provide the investor with the ability to
force the business to register a class of shares with the SEC.187  Demand
rights are often contingent on the occurrence or non-occurrence of certain
events or conditions.188
Allowing investors to control the decision to make a public offering of
the business’ shares protects the investor when the entrepreneur has ma-
jority control and complete decision making authority over the busi-
ness.189  The shareholder can either sell her shares in any public offering
or force a public offering as a method of exiting the venture.190  While
piggyback registration rights mitigate the investor’s perceived risk, de-
mand rights shift control to the investor and risk to the entrepreneur.  Spe-
cifically, an investor may demand registration to pursue an exit that does
not benefit the entrepreneur or the business.  This particular situation,
known as grandstanding, occurs when the investor seeks an exit to pro-
mote personal interests rather than those of the business.191  In practice,
parties negotiate to limit the ability of the investor to unilaterally initiate a
public offering;192 as such, registration rights are more of a tool that offers
the investor leverage or control in the relationship.193
The effect of registration rights as term sheet provisions is to recognize
a lack of trust in the entrepreneur’s decision to pursue an exit event and
offering] (so-called “piggyback rights”) or to request that an [initial public offering] or pri-
vate placement of shares take place (so-called “demand rights”).”).
185. Valerie Ford Jacob, et al., Key Considerations in Drafting a Registration Rights
Agreement from the Company’s Perspective, 41 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 113, 118
(2008).
186. Id. at 118–19.
187. Id. at 116.
188. Id. at 116–7.
189. See WILMERDING, supra note 150, at 65–68 (providing examples of registration
provision demonstrating alternating levels of investor control).
190. Jacob et al., supra note 185, at 118.
191. Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 46, at 351 (“Without private benefits from contin-
uation, the most dramatic risk to the entrepreneur is that the venture capitalist will attempt
to extract wealth under threat of pursuing an exit strategy that is unfavorable to the entrepre-
neur. Less dramatically, the venture capitalist might engage in ‘grandstanding’—taking the
company public too early, which reduces the financial value of the transaction to all parties
but results in private benefits to the venture capitalist, such as the reputational boost that
accompanies the funding of a successful company.”) (internal citation omitted).
192. Id. at 353 (“The practice of postponing the effective date of registration rights with
each new investment implies that demand rights are not designed to provide venture capital-
ists with the right of initiation.”).
193. Id. at 353–54, (“Gunderson et al., assert that demand registration rights are ‘rarely
used,’ but suggest that they ‘often provide Investors with leverage in dealing with manage-
ment with respect to the nature and timing of Company-initiated registrations.’”) (internal
citations omitted).
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allocate additional control to the investor.  The inclusion of either piggy-
back or demand right provisions is a recognition of the investor’s per-
ceived risk and a demonstration of a lack of trust in the entrepreneur.  The
choice of the type of registration right will vary the level of control de-
manded, but the inclusion of a registration right itself acknowledges per-
ceived risk and demonstrates a lack of trust.  While the provisions may be
necessary to reach an agreement, these provisions run counter to the de-
velopment of a relational contract.  The parties should be aware of this
effect and negotiate these provisions in a manner that has the least poten-
tial to hinder cooperation between the investor and entrepreneur, which
can sacrifice firm value.
3. Terms Related to Subsequent Rounds of Equity Offerings
Investors and entrepreneurs may incorporate controls concerning the
right or obligation to invest in any new offerings of the business’ equity
and concerning any barriers to the sale of equity to outside parties.  A
common provision is the pay-to-play provision, which incentivizes inves-
tors to take part in future rounds of financing of the start-up.194  This pro-
vision requires an investor to invest in future equity rounds at an amount
equivalent to her percentage of equity ownership in the business.  This
helps to avoid dilution and the potential loss of preferential rights.195  The
pay-to-play provision also protects the entrepreneur from the risk that the
investor will hinder future rounds of financing by refusing to roll her eq-
uity position into the new offering.196  This provision may demonstrate the
entrepreneur’s perceived risk that the investor will fail to follow through
on assurances of participation in additional financing rounds.
Depending on how the provision is structured, the investor may see
pay-to-play provisions as a favorable control mechanism that reserves her
right to participate in future offerings.  As such, the provision could re-
present the perceived risk that the entrepreneur will act opportunistically
in seeking to exclude the investor in future rounds of financing. In either
event, allocating control over participation in future funding rounds dem-
onstrates an absence of trust in the other party’s intentions.  As with other
such provisions, these provisions can run counter to relationship con-
tracting and diminish the cooperation between the parties.
194. John R. LeClaire et al., WatchMark Ruling Clarifies Pay-To-Play, 45 VENTURE
CAP. J. 64, 64 (2005).
195. Id. If the investor fails or is unable to provide the necessary amount of funds, she
will lose some preferred rights associated with her equity. Id. For example, the investor may
lose a degree of anti-dilution protection by failing to participate. Id. In a down round, where
equity is sold at a cheaper rate than in prior rounds, this is a very important provision be-
cause a failure to participate will cause dilution and a loss of overall value.
196. Id. at 65. It is common for the investor to lose preferred rights automatically or at
the insistence of the other business owners in order to facilitate the new offering. For exam-
ple, the investor may be forced into converting the preferred stock into a lesser form of
preferred stock or into common stock.
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4. Preemption, Co-Sale & Drag-Along Rights
Preemption rights are control mechanisms that generally grant one
party the right of first refusal to purchase shares being offered for sale by
an existing shareholder.197  For example, a business may hold the first
right to purchase any shares sold by any shareholder, who can only sell the
shares to an outside party if the business first refuses to purchase them.198
Through the decisions of the business’ owners or directors, the business
retains the option of refusing to purchase the shares.199  If the business
elects to purchase the shares, however, the shareholder is entitled to the
price per share agreed upon by a disinterested third party.200  Preemption
rights are often accompanied by ancillary shareholder agreements that fur-
ther limit the ability of investors to sell or otherwise transfer ownership in
the business.201  These provisions protect the existing business owners
from a perceived risk of opportunistic behavior by other shareholders.
While these provisions stand to affect both the investor and the entrepre-
neur, they more commonly protect the entrepreneur from an investor who
wishes to exit the venture through the sale of her shares to unknown and
potentially undesirable third parties.
Co-sale rights are control provisions that protect the investor’s interest
by preventing founding entrepreneurs from selling their equity interests
and leaving equity investors still holding their shares.202  While these pro-
visions mitigate rather than shift risk among the parties, they also demon-
strate a general lack of trust in the intention of the entrepreneur with
regard to the venture.  Drag-along rights, on the other hand, are control
provisions that can protect against minority shareholders holding up a deal
for the sale of the business.203  These provisions have a risk shifting effect
and may protect or detriment either the investor or the entrepreneur, de-
197. Armin Schwienbacher, Venture Capital Exits, in VENTURE CAPITAL: INVESTMENT
STRATEGIES, STRUCTURES, AND POLICIES 387, 391 (2010) (Douglas Cumming ed., 2010)
(“Preemptive Rights: the right of a shareholder to retain some predetermined percentage of
ownership in the firm when new shares are issued.”); WILMERDING, supra note 150, at 69; see
also David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 4–5
(1999). See generally Sushil Bikhchandani, Steven A. Lippman, & Reade Ryan, On the Right-
of-First-Refusal, 5 ADVANCES THEORETICAL ECON. 1 (2005) (providing an economic analysis
of the generic right of first refusal in contracts).
198. See Walker, supra note 197, at 8–9.
199. See id. at 9–10.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 8–9.
202. Jeffrey M. Leavitt, Burned Angels: The Coming Wave of Minority Shareholder Op-
pression Claims in Venture Capital Start-up Companies, 6 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 223, 235 (2004)
(explaining that co-sale rights allow a shareholder to sell her shares on an equal field with
other shareholders because if any holder of an equity interest sells a determined percentage
of their shares in the business, the other investors have the option of selling their shares as a
portion of the deal).
203. Schwienbacher, supra note 197, at 391 (“Drag-along right is a call option given in a
trade sale to the strategic buyer on a partner’s shares (e.g., entrepreneur’s) when another
partner (e.g., the venture capitalist) sells hers.”).
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pending upon the equity structure. While a majority-shareholder entrepre-
neur is protected against investor hold up, a minority-shareholder
entrepreneur risks losing control of her business when majority-share-
holder investors pursue an exit event.  The status of the entrepreneur as
majority shareholder is subject to change as the ownership interest of the
entrepreneur is diluted with every subsequent round of investment.
The generally neutral effect of co-sale and preemption rights on the
allocation of risk and the potential risk-shifting effect of drag-along rights
make these provisions demonstrative of the overall level of trust and coop-
eration between the parties.  They are representative of the level of pro-
tection required by either party based upon a perceived risk in the other
party’s conduct.  These provisions can be powerful tools in an attempt to
achieve a relational contract that promotes trust and cooperation.  Unfor-
tunately for the parties, these provisions also have the potential to ad-
versely affect the level of cooperation between the parties.
5. Anti-dilution Measures
Dilution is the reduction in the percentage ownership interest of an
existing investor when a business issues new equity.204  Anti-dilution pro-
visions protect early investors from the risk of dilution by later rounds or
stages of investment.205  Anti-dilution provisions are generally divided
into full-ratchet anti-dilution provisions and weighted-average anti-dilu-
tion provisions.206  While full-ratchet anti-dilution provisions are the
strongest control provisions and provide the greatest protection to the in-
vestor, weighted-average anti-dilution provisions also provide considera-
ble protection for the investor.207  The extent of protection afforded an
investor under a weighted-average anti-dilution provision depends heavily
upon the formula used to calculate outstanding shares, which are referred
to as narrow-based and broad-based calculations.208  Among these calcu-
lations, the narrow-based formula for determining anti-dilution protection
offers greater protection to investor through a lower conversion price.209
As previously discussed, protecting a present shareholder from dilution
in future financing rounds is a strong investor preference.  Entrepreneurs,
who possess common stock, cannot reserve anti-dilution protection for
themselves because common stock is not convertible to another form of
204. See WILMERDING, supra note 150, at 53.
205. Vladimir Atanasov, Conflicts of Interest and Litigation in the Venture Capital In-
dustry, in VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, STRUCTURES, AND POLICIES 365, 371
(2010) (“The anti-dilution provision serve the role of standard preemptive rights in protect-
ing the [venture capitalists’] ownership stock from being diluted by the common stock hold-
ers in future rounds of financing.”).
206. See GOMPERS, & LERNER, supra note 104, at 145–48.
207. See WILMERDING, supra note 150, at 51–56 (providing examples of anti-dilution
clauses reflecting each of the discussed approaches).
208. Woronoff & Rosen, supra note 143, at 147–49 (2005)
209. Id.
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equity.210  As such, investors with anti-dilution protection enjoy a benefit
above that of entrepreneurs and non-preferred investors.  While this con-
trol mechanism reduces the risk to the investor, it generally exposes the
entrepreneur to a greater risk of dilution from later rounds of equity fi-
nancing.211  A point of conflict arises where the special treatment of inves-
tors with regard to dilution protects the investor at the expense of the
entrepreneur.  This scenario has the potential to introduce a point of con-
flict between the parties during future rounds of financing.  For example, it
may affect the willingness of the entrepreneur to seek future rounds of
equity funding, even when additional equity funding is in the best interest
of the venture.  Any such point of conflict serves as a hindrance to achiev-
ing a relational contract where cooperation drives increased firm
performance.
6. Special Provisions for Investor Control
Investors often negotiate into the term sheet several specific control
provisions reserving the ability to vote for the election of directors or for
the approval of certain business actions. These terms, generally referred to
as voting rights, grant the right to preferred shareholders to participate in
voting alongside common shareholders.212  This is an important power be-
cause the ability to vote on corporate affairs is often a primary characteris-
tic separating preferred and common shareholders.  Another common
investor control provision, known as protective rights, requires voting ap-
proval by a class of preferred shareholder for certain events, such as pur-
suing an exit event.213  The parties may select many types of events that
require preferred shareholder approval.214  These approval requirements
are perhaps the most direct control mechanisms available to the investors.
210. See Marcel Kahan, Anti-Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities, 2 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 147 (1995) (providing general information on the how anti-dilution as applied to
convertible securities).
211. Robert E. Hall & Susan E. Woodward, The Incentives to Start New Companies:
Evidence from Venture Capital 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
13056, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13056 (“Almost all contracts between
venture funds and entrepreneurs shift value toward venture in the case of a down round,
through anti-dilution provisions.”).
212. WILMERDING, supra note 150, at 58.
213. Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 46, at 346 (“Provisions requiring the approval of
business combinations (for example, mergers or consolidations) have obvious application.
Because [initial public offerings] almost inevitably require an amendment of the corpora-
tion’s charter, the right to prevent such amendments provides effective control over the tim-
ing of such an offering.”).
214. Examples of actions for which parties may require shareholder approval include:
merger, recapitalization, sale of major assets, changes in rights of preferred shareholders,
increasing/decreasing authorized common or preferred shares, creation of new classes of
shares with senior preferences or privileges to the preferred shareholders, decisions regard-
ing redemption of stock, changes bylaws or certificate of incorporation, increases or de-
creases the size of the board of directors, decisions on the payment of dividends, issuance of
debt of a predetermined amount or setting a debt threshold.
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They demonstrate a distinct lack of trust in the decision making of the
entrepreneur or other business managers.  To protect against total control
by the investors, the parties will often designate a minimum threshold of
preferred shares outstanding before such provisions become effective.
Investors may also require a control provision identifying specific
board seats for themselves or their representative.215  The investor may
require that the new class of shares holds the authority to elect a predeter-
mined number of directors to the board of directors.216  Through staged or
subsequent rounds of financing, the investor will require more seats on the
board and greater control over the business.217  In other words, investors
may acquire additional board seats either through negotiation or through
acquisition during future financing.218
Lastly, investors may attempt to exert a level of control by requiring
rights to monitor certain functions or business activities, typically referred
to as information rights.219  Prior research has investigated venture capi-
talist’s responses to the timeliness with which entrepreneurs shared infor-
mation and the level of influence and control the venture capitalist exerted
over the strategic direction of the venture.220  Results indicate that inves-
tors seek a balance between the ability to control over the venture and the
ability to exit the venture, which reduces risk by providing greater liquid-
ity.221  Provisions that enhance investors’ ability to exit the venture, there-
fore, may allow for less strenuous monitoring rights.222  Conversely,
215. WILMERDING, supra note 150, at 61.
216. Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 46, at 326 (“Almost all of the board composition
provisions follow the same three-stage structure: (1) A specified number of board seats are
allocated to the holders of each series (or multiple series voting together) of preferred stock;
(2) a specified number of board seats are allocated to the holders of common stock; and (3)
any remaining board seats are filled by the holders of preferred stock and the holders of
common stock voting together as a single class.”).
217. Id. at 326–27 (“Because venture capitalists typically gain additional board seats
with each round of investment, over time the board composition provisions of venture-
backed companies tend to move from ‘entrepreneur control’ or ‘contingent control’ to ‘inves-
tor control.’”).
218. Id. at 317 (citing William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred
Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 921 (2002)) (“Control is thus contin-
gent only in the sense that it shifts from common stockholders to preferred stockholders over
successive stages of financing, and this can occur either because the venture capitalists bar-
gain for additional seats on the board or because the venture capitalists acquire a majority
voting stake in the company.”).
219. See WILMERDING, supra note 150, at 64.
220. Sapienza & Korsgaard, supra note 71, at 545, 549–51.
221. See Ernst Maug, Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off Between
Liquidity and Control?, 53 J. FIN. 65 (1998). See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Ver-
sus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991).
222. Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 46, at 337 (“Investors who have easy exit options
will have correspondingly fewer incentives to invest in monitoring that is designed to improve
ongoing performance.”).
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investors may be willing to forgo enhanced exit options with greater moni-
toring rights.223
The provisions described above are a summary of major ancillary pro-
visions that may or may not be present in a term sheet or subsequent in-
vestment contract.  These provisions are notable because their inclusion in
the term sheet demonstrates early recognition by investors of perceived
risks related to decision making within the business.  This fact can set the
tone or serve as a bellwether for the nature of the relationship between
the parties.  A relational contract between the parties may exclude these
provisions, whereas a discrete contractual relationship may contain any
number of these provisions.  In any event, the research demonstrates the
interplay between perceived risk and the allocation of control rights to a
single party.  Consistent with the above discussion, these control rights re-
duce the trust afforded a party and, in turn, affect cooperation between
the parties.
7. Special Employee Provisions
The parties often negotiate numerous employee-related provisions into
the term sheet.  These provisions serve as control mechanisms to either
incentivize current management or allocate control over management to
the investor.  As discussed throughout, the control provisions employed by
the investor seek to wrest away control of aspects of the business from
individuals managing the business.  Regarding the internal management of
the venture, investors may want to control specific aspects of the hiring
and incentivizing of managers.224  For example, the retention of current
management, namely the entrepreneur and her team, may be an express
condition to the funding deal.
An obvious conflict arises when the investor does not want to retain
the entrepreneur as the business leader.225  A controlling entrepreneur is
likely to step down upon investor request when the business is financially
constrained.226  Research indicates that the more developed the business,
the greater the likelihood that the entrepreneur will step aside.227  This
coincides with the tendency of a controlling investor, generally a later
223. Id. at 337–38 (“The corollary holds that investors may be willing to foreclose exit
options where monitoring is sufficiently valuable to the firm.”); Id. at 338 (citing Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)) (“The decision to constrain exit options may
be made by the firm or the investors. In either event, the costs of reducing liquidity should be
borne by the firm.”).
224. See WILMERDING, supra note 150, at 76–78.
225. Hellmann, supra note 7, at 57 (“Probably the most contentious issue is the compo-
sition of top management, especially whether a founder should (at some point) resign from
his or her position as the CEO.”).
226. Id. at 70 (“Wealth-constrained entrepreneurs are more likely to relinquish control,
even if it hurts the entrepreneurs interest more than it helps the venture.”).
227. Id. at 58 (“The probability of the entrepreneur being replaced rises with the age of
the business.”).
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round investor, to prefer a professional manager to manage the on-going
affairs of the business.228  Recall that the entrepreneur managing a busi-
ness receives unique benefits from those of the investor, who focuses on a
return on investment.229  As discussed above, this can thwart cooperation
or create dissent between the parties.
As a corollary, the investor may see the entrepreneur leaving the ven-
ture as a significant risk for future success.  In light of this perceived risk,
following a round of equity investment, entrepreneurs generally receive
additional ownership interest in the business that vests over a predeter-
mined period of time.230  These provisions add certainty that the entrepre-
neur will continue to manage the business for an extended period.  If the
entrepreneur leaves early, any non-vested stock is lost and the vested
stock is subject to buyback at a predetermined price.231
Within the capitalization structure, the parties routinely designate a
specific percentage of the business’ shares for use as incentives or as com-
pensation to management.232  These equity reserves use compensation to
incentivize employees to perform at their best.233  As with founders, em-
ployees incentivized with equity ownership in the business will generally
have their equity interest vest over a specified period of time.234  Allowing
stock to vest over a specified period aligns company and employee inter-
ests and provides employees with an incentive to grow the value of the
business.  This provision protects investors from losing money and the em-
ployee from unfairly profiting when the business is sold very early in its
development.235  If employees fail to perform and are fired prior to all of
the stock vesting, then the firm will have to repurchase less equity.  As an
228. Id. at 70 (“[W]hen venture capitalists have control, they provide greater effort in
finding professional managers who increase the value of the company.”).
229. Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 46, at 345 (citing Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal
Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture-Capital-Financed
Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 132).
230. See Hellmann, supra note 7, at 58.
231. Id.
232. Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 141, at 9; see Hall & Woodward, supra, note 211,
at 11 (citing Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 141, at 9) (“The entrepreneurs vest in the
shares upon reaching milestones in the contract. In addition, non-founder employees vest in
stock options based on longevity and other factors. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003), Table 2,
report on both elements of vesting in terms of ownership shares if no vesting occurs and if all
vesting occurs.”). See generally, John R.M. Hand, Give Everyone a Prize? Employee Stock
Options in Private Venture-backed Firms, 23 J. BUS. VENTURING 385, 385–404 (2008)
(presenting statistical data on firms employing stock option plans to incentivize employees).
233. Hand, supra note 232.
234. Hall & Woodward, supra note 211, at 11.
235. For example, the investor may invest $100,000 in the business.  The entrepreneurs
have time, effort, and $10,000 invested, but own 50% of the business. Someone offers
$200,000 to purchase the entire business. That would mean the investor would receive
$100,000 for her 50% of equity and entrepreneurs would receive $100,000. This could be a big
win for the entrepreneur, yet the business has not yet capitalized.
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additional protection feature, employee equity agreements generally have
some form of restriction on the transfer or sale of the equity.236
Lastly, investors may want any inventions by members of the business
to become the property of the business.237  Many start-up ventures survive
and grow only through new internal inventions or innovations.238  Inves-
tors may depend on these breakthroughs to drive business growth and
value.  Investors impose strict control rights over employees and contrac-
tors to reduce the risk of losing any invention or intellectual property.239
This risk is most relevant where the entrepreneur is the driver of innova-
tion within the business, but also has divergent business interests.
8. Special Rights and Protections to Investors
Other special rights and protections allocated between the parties re-
late to the use of representations, warranties, restrictive covenants, and
conditions precedent.240  These are all control provisions that reduce the
risk to entrepreneurs and investors.  The investor will require certain facts
and assurances about the business that may be restated later in the
purchase agreement.  These representations provide investors the right to
financial claims against the entrepreneur if she misrepresented the busi-
ness.241  In practice, this often includes representations about the business
that are tenuous.242  The entrepreneur for her part will want to minimize
personal liability by limiting any such claims to the business.
The use of restrictive covenants varies extensively based upon the na-
ture of the deal and the parties involved.  In venture capital contracts, re-
strictive covenants are found within the “protective provisions” section.243
In essence, these provisions specifically control any number of activities of
the entrepreneurs or business managers.  Common restrictive covenants
include: protective rights of new investors in subsequent rounds; informa-
tion rights concerning the extent of investor access or right to company
information; provisions governing expenses and allocating transaction
costs; indemnification of individuals for money lost if the deal is not con-
summated; provisions restricting assignment of rights or interests in the
236. See generally Melisa B. Frye, Equity-Based Compensation for Employees: Firm
Performance and Determinants, 27 J. FIN. RES. 3 (2004) (presenting an empirical analysis of
common employee equity compensation plans).
237. See WILMERDING, supra note 150, at 79–80 (providing an example of a “proprie-
tary information and inventions clause”).
238. See generally PETER DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (2014) (ex-
plaining the role of innovation in the development of entrepreneurial ventures).
239. Id. at 79.
240. See generally Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 141 (presenting an empirical analy-
sis of the common terms employed in venture capital contracts).
241. Id.
242. See STEPHEN BLOOMFIELD, VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
RAISING FINANCING 185 (2d ed., Kogan Page 2008).
243. See WILMERDING, supra note 150, at 58–61.
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business; and no-shop provisions providing for deal exclusivity and re-
stricting the ability of the business to reference this term sheet or planned
transaction to other investors.  While potential restrictive covenants are
too numerous to list and an explanation of these provisions exceeds the
scope and intent of this Article, it is important to understand the control
function of covenants in these agreements.
IV. THE VALUE EFFECT OF AWARENESS OF PERCEPTION DURING
NEGOTIATION
Cooperation among all stakeholders within a start-up venture is gener-
ally imperative to the success of the venture.244  The state of coopetition
that exists early in the investor-entrepreneur relationship may cause self-
serving behavior by either party.245  Any such behavior is detrimental to
the formation of a relational contract that continues throughout the inves-
tor-entrepreneur relationship.  Trust in the other party develops from
characteristics of the individual,246 and it reflects the belief that the other
party will act as expected.247  Cooperation thus allows for the efficient util-
ization of the human and physical capital available to the business.248  As
such, it is important to undertake measures to facilitate cooperation that
will ultimately benefit both parties.
Risk perception is germane to the development of trust because the
degree of perceived risk dictates the extent to which one party trusts the
other.249  Consistent with this Article’s conceptual model, perceived risk
creates the disposition toward inclusion of control provisions in the term
sheet.  Cooperation, as demonstrated through interactions between the
parties, creates a feedback loop that introduces or allows for greater trust
in the relationship.  Risk is not constant; it involves the probability of a
combination of potential occurrences that change over the life of the busi-
ness venture.250  The negotiation of term sheet provisions captures a
party’s perceived risks at a finite point in the investor-entrepreneur rela-
tionship.251  While term sheet provisions are simply mechanisms to control
244. See generally Sapienza & Korsgaard, supra note 71 (providing an analysis of nu-
merous aspects of the investor entrepreneur that influence effective management of the
firm).
245. See Luo et al., supra note 10; Khanin & Turel, supra note 70.
246. See Shepherd & Zacharakis, supra note 70, at 130.
247. See Bottazzi et al., supra note 63, at 1.
248. See generally Sapienza, supra note 76 (discussing the value venture capitalists add
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those perceived risks at that time, developing a relational contract that is
characterized by higher degrees of cooperation can lead to increased value
creation in the current relationship and in future interaction between the
parties.  For example, establishing or building toward a relationship con-
tract could affect decisions about future rounds of financing.  The absence
of a control provision either reflects a level of trust with regard to a per-
ceived risk or a party’s failure to perceive that particular risk in the rela-
tionship.  The acknowledgement and conscious exclusion of any of the
control provisions explained above may signal the relational nature of the
agreement.
The implications of this Article’s conceptual model of the investor-en-
trepreneur relationship concern the negotiation of early stage term sheets.
Awareness and acknowledgement of the other party’s perceived risk can
facilitate an efficient allocation of control in the investor-entrepreneur re-
lationship that lends itself to a relational agreement between the parties.
The effect of the efficient allocation of control through relational con-
tracting is maximum utilization of the physical and human capital available
to the business.  Consistent with this Article’s construct, the level of trust
between the parties may be observed in the contractual or semi-contrac-
tual provisions outlining the investor-entrepreneur relationship.  In turn,
there is likely a correlation between the extent of investor control and the
level of cooperation between the parties in the execution of their obliga-
tions to the business venture.
CONCLUSION
The parties to a venture funding agreement exist in a state of coopeti-
tion.  The parties account for perceived risk in the entrepreneur-investor
relationship through varying levels of control demanded and trust af-
forded the other party.  The level of risk perceived by each party may
differ along individual aspects of a prospective equity deal.  The provisions
of the term sheet delineate the subjective risk perceptions of each party to
the transaction by allocating control or trusting a party with decision-mak-
ing rights.  When negotiating term sheet provisions, a party should seek to
understand and recognize the risk perceived by the other party and at-
tempt to afford the level of control or trust necessary to achieve a rela-
tional agreement that provides the greatest value for the parties
collectively.  This is a difficult undertaking; not all risk factors are readily
discernable at the inception of the entrepreneur-investor relationship. Fur-
ther, every negotiation or transaction is unique as to the subjective risks
perceived by the parties.  This fact magnifies the need to understand the
risk perceived by the other party, as risk perception becomes the driver of
the level of coopetition existing in the relationship.
An optimal allocation of control and trust adequately captures the per-
ceived risk of each party, promotes cooperation between the parties and,
ultimately, facilitates the performance of the business venture.  Under-
standing of subjective risk perception of each party to the investment
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transaction will facilitate the objective of negotiating a term sheet that
maximizes the value created for all parties.
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